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Abstract:
Ambiguous terms and phrases in the United States Bill of Rights have caused a great deal
of controversy throughout United States history over what rights truly exist and which branch of
government should be responsible for determining those rights. These questions are currently
being debated in states throughout the country concerning the right to same-sex marriage. In
current literature, authors argue that a legal right to same-sex marriage exists through either the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the right to privacy. Authors disagree
over which section of the Constitution provides more stable legal footing for the legality of
same-sex marriage. Authors also disagree over whether the courts or the legislatures should be
responsible for defining the right. This thesis answers these questions of legality and
responsibility concerning the right to same-sex marriage. The thesis uses case law of the
doctrinal development of the Equal Protection Clause and the right to privacy to suggest that the
Equal Protection Clause provides the soundest legal precedent for the existence of the right to
same-sex marriage because the government is not able to pass the rational basis test. Case studies
of the legalization of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, New York, and California are used to
test Ronald Dworkin’s theory that the right should be developed by the courts rather than the
legislatures. The thesis provides the theoretical groundwork that advocates of this right should
focus on litigation rather than legislation to implement social change.
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Introduction to Thesis
Although the rights established in the United States Constitution were created over two
hundred years ago, there still is a great deal of controversy over the development of rights today.
Several states throughout the country are currently debating whether or not the Constitution
creates a right to same-sex marriage. Legal and political scholars disagree about which section of
the Constitution establishes the right to same-sex marriage. Several authors argue that the right
can be found in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (see Gerstmann,
Hiller, Schmidtke, Strasser and Schaff). Fewer authors, including William Hohengarten and
Brenda Feigen, argue that the right exists under the right to privacy. Also, authors who argue that
that the Equal Protection Clause establishes the right disagree about the way it establishes the
right. Some scholars argue that there should be no classification system under the Equal
Protection Clause that gives certain minority groups greater levels of protection than others (see
Gerstmann and Schmidtke). Other scholars argue that minority groups of sexual orientation
should receive increased protections against discrimination from the government (see Hiller,
Strasser and Schaff).
In addition to the arguments over where the right can be found in the Constitution, the
topic of who in the government should be responsible for defining and determining rights has
been explored by many well respected political and legal scholars. There is a general
disagreement between scholars over which branch of government should determine the existence
of rights. One of the most influential rights scholars, Ronald Dworkin, argues that the courts
should be responsible for the creation and development of constitutional rights because they are
more likely to recognize the rights of minorities. Stuart Scheingold and Gerald Rosenberg
challenge Dworkin’s argument and claim that the courts are unable to produce true social change
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and therefore, the legislatures should develop constitutional rights. These unsettled questions of
who should be responsible for the development of rights, and where the right to same-sex
marriage exists, leaves room for further research and investigation concerning the advancement
of rights.
In this thesis, I answer the questions of whether a constitutional right to same-sex
marriage exists and which branch of the government, the legislatures or the courts, should be
responsible for defining and developing the right. For the first question, I use case law to
compare the doctrinal development of the Equal Protection Clause and the right to privacy. The
comparison determines whether either of these sections of the Constitution provides the legal
precedent for recognizing a right to same-sex marriage. The cases Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) are used to explain the Equal Protection Clause
claim. The cases Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003) are used to explain the right to privacy claim. I hypothesize that these analyses will
show that a right to same-sex marriage exists under the Equal Protection Clause. Once the
analysis of the doctrinal development has been completed, extra-legal evidence, such as the
research findings from sociological, medical and psychological organizations, are utilized to
demonstrate how the government’s justification for prohibiting same-sex marriage does not pass
the rational basis test and, thus, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
To answer the question of which branch of government should be responsible for
defining the right, I rely on Ronald Dworkin’s theory that the courts should be responsible
because they are insulated from the majority which allows them to fairly recognize minority
rights. Currently, eight states and Washington D.C. have legalized same-sex marriage. In 2003,
Massachusetts was the first state to fully legalize same-sex marriage and start issuing marriage
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licenses. Prior to legalization in Massachusetts both the Hawaii Supreme Court and the Vermont
Supreme Court had made rulings that their states’ denial of same-sex marriage violated their
state constitutions. However, neither of these rulings resulted in the legalization of same-sex
marriage. Instead, Hawaiian residents allowed the Hawaii Legislature to pass legislation defining
marriage between a man and a woman. In Vermont, the State Supreme Court allowed the
Vermont Legislature to merely pass legislation creating domestic partnerships rather than full
recognition of same-sex marriage. Following the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision
legalizing same-sex marriage, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, Washington D.C.,
New York, Washington and Maryland have all legalized same-sex marriage. To test Dworkin’s
theory, I employ case studies of three states that have legalized, or temporarily had legalized,
same-sex marriage: Massachusetts, New York, and California. I use public opinion polling data
on support for an amendment defining marriage between a man and a woman to test whether the
court’s can find such a right despite what majority opinion may have to say regarding it. In the
end the data show that courts are more likely to recognize minority rights and therefore,
Dworkin’s theory is most applicable to the right to same-sex marriage.

Significance of Thesis
Obtaining clear answers for whether there is a legal right to same-sex marriage and which
branch of the government should define the right is important for several reasons. This thesis
challenges and adds to two major arguments that exist in literature concerning law and social
change. The argument over whether the legislatures or the courts should define rights pertains to
the political duties of the branches of government. This thesis shows that Dworkin’s theory that
the courts should define individual rights is more applicable for defining the right to marriage
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than the alternative hypothesis that the legislatures should define rights. This is significant
because it suggests that Dworkin’s theory applies to a contemporary issue that it has not been
greatly tested on. It is also important to resolve which branch of government is responsible for
determining rights because it clarifies the proper roles that each branch plays in the government.
Furthermore, determining which branch should be responsible for the development of rights
provides the theoretical groundwork for those advocating for this right to use the courts, rather
than the legislatures to instigate social change.
Determining that the government is violating the Equal Protection Clause by denying
same-sex couples’ right to marriage will put to rest the question of the constitutionality of samesex marriage, which is still widely debated today. Having a clear legal argument will help
supporters of same-sex marriage persuade courts to legalize the right. In existing literature,
authors generally make one of two arguments to support the claim that the right to same-sex
marriage exists under the Equal Protection Clause. The first argument is that as a minority class,
sexual orientation should be given a greater level of protection against government laws. These
authors argue that if sexual orientation is given a greater level of protection, the government
would not be justified in prohibiting same-sex marriage. The second argument is that all minority
groups should be given the same level of protections against government laws and that if sexual
orientation was given the same protections as religious and racial minorities, the government
could not legally prohibit same-sex marriage. This thesis does not rely on either of these
arguments. Instead, it provides a unique and significant contribution to the study of the Equal
Protection Clause because it argues that even with sexual orientation classified under the lowest
level of protection, the government does not provide a legitimate interest in prohibiting same-sex
marriage, and therefore, is violating the Equal Protection Clause.
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Thus, this thesis is significant because it adds to and tests existing political rights theory.
It also suggests the proper roles and responsibilities of the branches of government. It provides
theoretical groundwork for advocates of same-sex marriage to use the courts rather than
legislatures to legalize the right. Finally, it provides unique constitutional reasoning for why
same-sex marriage should be legalized.

Literature Review
The issue of legalization of same-sex marriage in the United States is highly controversial
due to the American public’s varying moral, religious and political views. Aside from these
personal views, the legalization of same-sex marriage is a vastly contested legal issue in
academia. Among legal and political scholars, there exist varying theories about whether there is
a constitutional right to gay and lesbian marriages and whether the legislatures or the courts
should be responsible for determining and developing the right. For the first question, most
existing literature argues that a right to same-sex marriage exists through the Equal Protection
Clause (see Gerstmann, Hiller, Schaff, Schmidtke and Strasser). Although authors also focus on
the right to privacy, there is greater support among scholars for using the Equal Protection
Clause as the pathway to legalization. There are two common arguments made by the existing
literature concerning the Equal Protection Clause. The first of these arguments claims that the
Supreme Court’s should abolish its classification system for determining discrimination and
instead, all minority groups should receive the same protection across the board. Currently, the
Supreme Court has not held sexual orientation as a “suspect class” which would afford this
minority group the greatest amount of protection from government discrimination (Strasser 24).
Authors like Evan Gerstmann and Eric Schmidtke make the case that all minority groups should
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be given the same level of protection against government legislation under the Equal Protection
Clause. Gerstmann comments on this when he writes, “The Court has failed to give any rational
justification for treating the rights of different groups differently, and the explanations it has put
forward are incoherent” (7). These authors argue that if sexual orientation received the same
protection as all other minority groups, including race and religion, the government’s arguments
against legalizing same-sex marriage would not be sufficient enough to justify the inequitable
treatment that gay and lesbian couples receive (Schmidtke 227). Therefore, much of the existing
literature is dedicated to the idea that the Equal Protection Clause needs to be revised to give all
minorities the same protection from discrimination under the law.
The second argument that is made concerning the Equal Protection Clause is not that the
classification system should be done away with, but that sexual orientation should be moved to a
class that entails stricter review of discriminating government legislation. This is the argument
Strasser makes when he writes, “The class of lesbians, gays, and bisexuals, although not yet
recognized as suspect or quasi-suspect, deserves to be so recognized because it already meets the
relevant standards” (30). The standards that he provides are that the minority group must be
unable to control the characteristic that makes them a minority, they must have experienced
prolonged discrimination and unequal treatment and they must have been unable to protect their
interests due to majoritarian politics (Strasser 26). He uses these criteria to suggest that gay and
lesbian couples meet the characteristics of a suspect class. This argument is also made by Kory
Schaff when he writes, “While sexual orientation is neither a suspect classification like race, nor
a quasi classification like gender, there are strong reasons why it should trigger heightened
scrutiny of legislation” (133).
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Like Strasser, Schaff goes on to explain criteria for determining if a minority falls under
the classification of suspect class and comes to the conclusion that sexual orientation meets the
criteria. Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller also makes the argument that the Court has not given
significant consideration to the level of protection that sexual minorities should receive.
Referring to the Equal Protection Clause he writes, “Indeed nearly commensurate with the
creation of the doctrine was a judicial unwillingness to expand suspect or quasi-suspect class
status…to other groups demanding protection” (Hiller 20). Similarly to Gerstmann and
Schmidtke, these authors claim that if the proper amount of scrutiny were applied to legislation
involving discrimination against sexual orientation, it would not be possible for the government
to deny same-sex couples the right to marry.
Therefore, existing literature argues for the use of the Equal Protection Clause to
establish the right to same-sex marriage in two different ways. However, these authors all arrive
at the conclusion that if sexual orientation was given a proper classification, there would be no
way that the government could justify prohibiting same-sex marriage. Although these arguments
appear correct, existing literature does not greatly examine if the government’s interest in
prohibiting same-sex marriage is justified based on the lowest level of scrutiny, which is the
level in which sexual orientation is currently classified. My thesis argues that even under sexual
orientation’s current classification, the government does not pass the lowest level of scrutiny for
prohibiting same-sex marriage. I examine the common reasons given for barring same-sex
marriage including the state’s interest in promoting procreation, childrearing and stable family
life. I argue that these are not sufficient reasons for prohibiting same-sex marriage due to
scientific and social data collected from several respected scholars and organizations.
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Most authors advocate the use of the Equal Protection Clause to establish a right to samesex marriage. However, due to past Supreme Court cases that have involved the right to privacy
and gay rights or marriage rights, some authors believe the right of privacy establishes a right to
gay marriage. These authors argue that the Court has recognized that marriage is a fundamental
right and that certain aspects of marriage are protected under the constitutional right to privacy
(see Feigen and Hohengarten). William Hohengarten comments on this idea when he writes:
“The right of privacy prevents the state from taking over the lives of individual citizens by
making basic familial decisions for them” (1523). He argues that the familial decision of whether
or not a couple should get married should be left to the couple, not the state (Hohengarten 1523).
Therefore, he finds that the state should not discriminate based on the gender or sex of a couple
that wants to get married. He writes that the state has “the obligation to create a legal framework
for marriage and to open it equally to adult couples regardless of gender” (Hohengarten 1523).
Brenda Feigen uses past legal decisions to argue that the right to privacy creates a right to samesex marriage. She cites Lawrence v. Texas (2003) and argues that since the Court found a
personal right for same-sex couples to engage in private sexual conduct, it is the next logical step
for the Court to recognize that same-sex couples are entitled to make private decisions about who
they wish to marry. Feigen writes, “Since intimate conduct is, indeed, but one element in an
enduring personal bond, it certainly seems as though the state's sanctioning that bond through
marriage would be a next step, as was taken in Goodridge” (350). Feign and Hohengarten argue
that the right to privacy includes the right to make certain family decisions without the direct
interference or judgment of the government, including the decision of marriage.
Although there is existing literature that argues that the right to same-sex marriage exists
through the right to privacy, there are scholars who oppose this view. Authors like Jonathan
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Rauch and Charles Mauney Jr. contend that marriage is a public institution, and therefore, the
right to privacy does not apply to same-sex marriage. Rauch specifically examines the Supreme
Court ruling of Lawrence v. Texas (2003). He states that the Lawrence decision upheld same-sex
couples’ right to engage in private consensual sexual relations because sex is private conduct
(Rauch 2003). He maintains that since marriage is a public institution, the state has an interest in
it and therefore, the right to privacy does not establish a right to same-sex marriage (Rauch
2003). Charles Mauney Jr. makes a similar argument about Lawrence. Like Rauch, he claims
that marriage is part of public society and therefore, Lawrence does not apply to same-sex
marriage. He also notes that the Supreme Court’s written decision in Lawrence stressed that the
government could make certain restrictions in the private realm (Mauney 158). Therefore, these
authors claim that the right to privacy cannot be used to justify a right to same-sex marriage
because marriage is public, not private.
Clearly, there are differing views on whether the right to privacy establishes a right to
same-sex marriage. The argument that appears more convincing is Rauch and Mauney’s
argument that the right to privacy does not apply to same-sex marriage. Particularly, the wording
in the decision for Lawrence suggests that the Court does not want to extend the right to privacy
to include the right for same-sex couples to marry. In my thesis, I analyze the written decision
for Lawrence and I suggest that the better route for supporters of same-sex marriage to take for
legalization is through the use of the Equal Protection Clause, which provides sound legal
reasoning.
Assuming that there is a Constitutional right to same-sex marriage, authors of existing
literature disagree over which branch of the government should be responsible for developing the
right. The two competing ideologies are that the courts should develop constitutional rights and
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that the legislatures should develop these rights. The Executive is rarely considered in this
argument because it is not responsible for interpreting constitutional laws. Several authors
believe that the courts should determine right because they are not easily influenced by the
political majority and are more likely to recognize the rights guaranteed to minorities through the
Constitution (see Dworkin, Hiller, Schmidtke and Nussbaum). The second school of thought
argues that the legislatures should develop rights because the courts are ineffective and their
decisions are only enforced with the help of outside factors such as the support of legislatures,
economic support or approval through public opinion (see Rosenberg and Scheingold). Unlike
the argument of whether the Equal Protection Clause or the right to privacy establishes a right to
same-sex marriage, there is greater disagreement among existing literature over which of these
two schools of thought is correct.
The first argument in support of the courts is made by several authors who take a more
positive view of the courts’ abilities to instigate social and political change. Ronald Dworkin
argues that the courts are more suited to recognize rights because they are insulated from the
political majority, which historically has been unwilling to recognize the rights of minorities
(130). Dworkin expands on this idea when he writes, “The Constitution, and particularly the Bill
of Rights, is designed to protect individual citizens and groups against certain decisions that a
majority of citizens might want to make” (133). He argues that the majority of American citizens
do not encourage the legislatures to recognize minority rights because of their own personal
prejudices. He believes that because many judges on courts are not elected by American citizens;
they will be less influenced by the desires of the majority and more willing to recognize minority
rights (Dworkin 133). He writes that “to make the majority judge in its own cause seems
inconsistent and unjust” (Dworkin 142). Therefore, he believes that to ensure a fair recognition
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of rights, the courts must be responsible for defining them. Since he wrote his book in the 1970s,
he does not directly address the issue of same-sex marriage. However, I plan to test Dworkin’s
theory to suggest that his ideas still apply over thirty years later to the contemporary issue of
same-sex marriage.
Other authors have agreed with Dworkin and believe that the right to same-sex marriage
must be determined by the courts. Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller writes, “Equal Protection law has
one of its justifications in ‘representational reinforcement,’ or the constitutional imperative to
protect minorities who would otherwise remain at the mercy of political majorities” (20). Here,
Hiller argues that the courts have always been responsible for protecting minority rights from
majoritarian politics. Additionally, Eric Schmidtke makes the argument that state legislatures
have already greatly limited the right to same-sex marriage (219). He believes that the actions of
these legislatures have been incorrect and that the Supreme Court is the only avenue to correct
this injustice (Schmidtke 236). Martha Nussbaum makes a very similar argument that minorities’
right to marriage has historically not been protected by the states and that these rights must be
recognized by the courts. She argues that the Supreme Court was responsible for recognizing the
right to interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia (1967), and therefore, it is the Court’s duty to
extend the right of marriage to same-sex couples (Nussbaum 48). The general agreement among
these authors is that courts should be responsible for determining the right to same-sex marriage
because they are more likely to identify rights of minorities than the legislatures.
The other argument that is often made in existing literature is that the legislatures should
develop rights. This argument is made by Gerald Rosenberg in his book, The Hollow Hope: Can
Courts Bring About Social Change?, and a law review article, “Saul Alinsky and the Litigation
Campaign to Win the Right to Same-Sex Marriage.” He claims that the courts are generally
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ineffective unless certain constraints are overcome through the support of the legislatures, the
market economy or public support. In his book, he argues that the courts have had an impact on
the legalization of same-sex marriage in certain ways. However, he points to the massive
backlash by sates against court rulings as evidence that the courts are ineffective at implementing
real social change (Rosenberg Hollow Hope 361).Unlike Dworkin, Rosenberg directly addresses
the issue of same-sex marriage in his book. However, his book is even somewhat outdated since
several states have legalized same-sex marriage since its publication. In an article he published
after his book, he addresses some of the changes that have occurred over time. Despite some
progress, he still sees the courts as ineffective and does not believe that nationwide legalization
will happen anytime soon (Rosenberg “Sal Alinsky” 662). He believes that the litigation
movement acted too quickly, ignoring that public support and political support for same-sex
marriage was lacking (Rosenberg “Saul Alinsky” 667). When these factors of support are
missing, he believes that litigation cannot be successful.
Stuart Scheingold makes a similar argument to Rosenberg by claiming that there is a
“myth of rights.” He defines this myth as “the assumption that litigation can evoke a declaration
of rights from courts; that it can, further, be used to assure the realization of these rights; and
finally, that realization is tantamount to meaningful change” (5). He provides the case of Brown
v. Board of Education (1954) as an example of the Court’s ineffectiveness when he writes,
“There is no need to look further than school desegregation problems to realize that the
declaration of rights does not purge political conflict of its power dimensions” (Scheingold 85).
Therefore, he argues that the only redeeming quality of judicial decisions is their ability to spark
a certain amount of political mobilization (Scheingold 136). The argument made by Scheingold
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and Rosenberg suggests that the courts are ineffective and those seeking change should look
elsewhere in government for results.
In my thesis, I test Dworkin’s theory to see if the courts truly are more likely to recognize
minority rights than legislatures. I use case studies of how same-sex marriage was legalized in
Massachusetts, New York and California. I look at public opinion polls to see if states that
legalized through their state supreme courts recognized the minority right despite a lack of public
opinion support. I also analyze whether states that legalized through their state legislatures were
more likely to do so because of public opinion support for same-sex marriage.
Overall, existing literature on the issue of same-sex marriage suggests that a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage exists and can be found in the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, there are differences in opinion on whether a
classification system should exist or whether sexual orientation should merely be classified in a
different group. Once a right to same-sex marriage is established, existing literature argues that
either the courts or the legislatures should be responsible for developing the right. Overall, there
is greater amount of disagreement between authors writing about the second question than the
first. This leaves room for my thesis to determine which of the two theories applies more
realistically to the issue of same-sex marriage.

Methods and Case Selection
To answer the questions I propose in this thesis, I use case law of the doctrinal
development of the Equal Protection Clause and the right to privacy, and case study of three
states that have legalized, or temporarily legalized same-sex marriage. I use case law to answer
the question of where the right is found in the U.S. Constitution. Particularly, I use Supreme
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Court cases that have addressed a violation of the Equal Protection Clause or the right to privacy
since scholars use these two sections of the Constitution most often to establish a right to samesex marriage. I examine the written decisions and oral arguments of these cases to determine if
the legal rationale behind the development of these constitutional doctrines applies to and
establishes a right to same-sex marriage.
The Equal Protection Clause is located in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and asserts that no person shall be denied equal protection of the laws (U.S. Const,
amend XIV). This means that all Americans need to be treated in the same way in similar
circumstances. The Supreme Court has created a classification system for determining if
minority groups are unequally discriminated against by certain government laws (Strasser 24).
Based on this classification system, there are three tests that the Court uses to determine if a
minority group’s rights have been violated by the government. The first is the lowest level of
government responsibility, or the rational basis test. Under this test, the government needs only
to prove that it a legitimate interest in the law and that the law is rationally related to that interest
(Strasser 24). This is the test that is used to determine if a law violates the Equal Protection
Clause rights of sexual minorities. Therefore, I selected Court cases that have dealt with a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause and resulted in the Court striking down government
laws discriminating against minority groups. In the first case, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967), the Court ruled that laws prohibiting interracial marriage violated the Equal Protection
Clause (at 13). This case applies to my thesis because it directly deals with the freedom of choice
of whom to marry. However, it also highlights the differences in classification that minority
groups receive since racial minorities are given greater protections than sexual minorities.
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The second case I use is Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In this case, the Court
ruled that a Colorado law violated the Equal Protection Clause by prohibiting protections from
being given to gay, lesbian and bisexual people against discrimination (at 635). This case applies
to my thesis because it deals with gay rights and a government law that failed to meet the rational
basis test under the Equal Protection Clause. I examine the written decisions of both these cases
and argue that legal precedent exists for using the Equal Protection Clause to establish a right to
same-sex marriage.
I also use cases that have dealt with the right to privacy, but I argue that there is
insufficient doctrinal precedent for using the right to privacy to establish a right to same-sex
marriage. The right to privacy is not explicitly stated in the Constitution. Instead, the Court ruled
that a right to privacy exists based on the wording in several Amendments to the Constitution
(Griswold v. Connecticut 1965, at 484). Since this right is not clearly stated in the Constitution,
there is a great deal of controversy over whether the right should be recognized or even exists.
Nevertheless, some scholars (see Feigen and Hohengarten) argue that the right to same-sex
marriage can be found in the precedent created by the right to privacy. I examine the written
decision in the case Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which established that a right
to privacy exists between married couples (at 485). I use the written decision of this case to argue
that it applies to the private practices of married couples, and therefore, does not apply to samesex marriage since marriage is a public institution. The other case I have selected is Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) , in which the Supreme Court ruled that laws criminalizing intimate
sexual relations between same-sex couples violated their right to privacy (at 578). I use this
decision to argue that although the right to privacy was used to establish a right between people
of the same-sex, the right was a personal right, unlike marriage which is a public government
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institution. I use the written decisions of these cases to argue that the right to privacy does not
apply to the issue of same-sex marriage.
In addition to the use of case law, I argue that not only does the right to same-sex
marriage exist under the Equal Protection Clause, but that the government fails to meet the
rational basis test for prohibiting same-sex marriage. I rely on scientific and sociological data to
refute the government’s most common arguments for prohibiting same-sex marriage including
the promotion of procreation, child rearing and stable family life. By illustrating how the
government has no rational basis for prohibiting same-sex marriage, I show how there is an
undeniable right to same-sex marriage under the Equal Protection Clause.
To make the argument that the courts should be responsible for the development of the
right, I use a case study of three states that have already legalized same-sex marriage. Currently,
in America eight states and Washington D.C. have legalized same-sex marriage (“State By
State”). More of these states have legalized same-sex marriage through state legislatures than
state courts. It is important to look at the process of legalization because it will reveal any
interaction that has occurred between the courts and legislatures, and their attempts to be the
final arbiter on the existence of the right. The actions taken by each of the branches to try to
settle the issue will reveal which branch has been more successful in determining the existence
of the right. Since it would be too extensive to detail how same-sex marriage became legalized in
the eight states and D.C., I compress the analysis to three states.
Massachusetts serves as a representation of the states that have legalized same-sex
marriage through the use of state supreme courts. Massachusetts is appropriate because it was the
first state to legalize the right through the courts in 2003 and then begin to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. Although there was backlash from the Massachusetts Legislature,
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it proved ineffective and Massachusetts continues to issue marriage licenses today. I consider
public opinion polls from 2003 on support for a constitutional amendment defining marriage
between a man and a woman from the Associated Press and CNN/Gallup/USA Today to see if
Dworkin’s theory explains why Massachusetts passed same-sex marriage.
New York will serve as a representation of the states and D.C. that have legalized samesex marriage through state legislatures. New York legalized same-sex marriage in 2011. I
consider public opinion polls from 2011 from the Associated Press/National Constitution
Center/GfK and Quinnipiac University to test Dworkin’s theory. Since New York legalized gay
marriage through its legislature, Dworkin’s theory would only stand if public opinion support
had declined for a constitutional amendment defining marriage between a man and women. If
this is true, it would support Dworkin’s idea that legislatures are more likely to recognize
minority rights when a majority of Americans support it. New York is a case that suggests that
there are instances in which legislatures have been responsible for the development of the right
to same-sex marriage.
Lastly, California provides an example of a state in which the two branches are currently
disputing over who should determine the existence of the right. Originally, the California
Supreme Court ruled that the state must legally allow same-sex marriage (In re Marriage Cases
2008, at 96). However, Proposition 8 was passed by California voters in 2008 and amended the
California Constitution to define marriage between one man and one woman (Cal Const). Today,
Proposition 8 is being challenged in the court case Perry v. Brown (2012) and has already been
ruled as violating the United States Constitution by Chief District Court Judge Vaughn R Walker
(Perry v. Schwarzenegger 2010, at 121). I examine the public opinion data around the time the
court decisions were made and Proposition 8 was passed to see if Dworkin’s theory is correct
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that legislatures follow majority opinion while courts are more likely to recognize minority
rights.
To make sure that the findings in this thesis are valid, it is necessary to give an
explanation of the proper and improper ways to conduct public opinion polls. Public opinion
polls are a way to measure Americans’ attitudes on controversial and prominent political issues.
Polls can be seen as a tool of democracy because citizens are allowed to directly voice their
opinions on issues that policymakers are considering. In Polling and the Public: What Every
Citizen Should Know, Herbert Asher explains, “Advocates of polls emphasize that polling is an
opportunity for citizens to participate in a democracy and that it permits quick and repeated
assessments of the opinions of the public” (14). Polls have also been said to influence the actions
of policymakers and other political leaders. However, Asher notes that “there is mixed empirical
evidence on the extent to which popular preferences are actually translated into public policy”
(21). Although evidence has shown that elected representatives are not consistently making
decisions based on polling data, some significant studies have revealed that a relationship exists
between policymakers’ decisions and public opinion (Asher 21). Asher writes that “some
empirical studies have found substantial congruence between the attitudes of the public and the
actions of government on certain issues (Page and Shapiro 1983, 1992; Erikson 1976)” (21). So,
it seems that public opinion data can be one factor that influences the way that elected officials
make decisions.
Although public opinion polls can be effective democratic tools and can be used to better
understand the actions of legislatures, they must also be viewed with a certain degree of caution.
When using polling data, it is important to understand the potential impact that the type of poll,
wording, sample size and response categories can have on the results that are generated. The type
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of poll that is conducted can influence the way that poll respondents answer questions. For
example, polls that are commissioned by a particular organization can be worded to influence the
poll taker to be more favorable to a political stance that the organization supports (Asher 5).
Asher notes that commissioned polls are normally conducted by biased political organizations
and are not normally used by media and news organizations (5). Since this thesis only uses
public opinion polls from news organizations and highly respected polling institutions, the
chance of biases resulting from commissioned polls is relatively low.
Asher calls polls that are unrepresentative and deceptive “pseudo-polls” (12). He explains
that “because of loaded and unfair question wording, self-selection biases in the respondents,
outright efforts to stack the results, or other deficiencies, pseudo-polls are poor ways to ascertain
public opinion” (Asher 14). Some examples of pseudo-polls include polls in which respondents
voluntarily select themselves to participate and polls that members of Congress send to people in
their districts (Asher 14). One acceptable type of poll that helps to prevent pseudo-polls is
telephone interviews. Telephone interviews use random digit dialing to create a sample of
participants that reflect the greater population (Asher 66). Some positive aspects of phone
interviews are that they are able to measure quickly changing issues, they are cheap and they are
not as intrusive for respondents (Asher 66). Additionally, it is important for polls to collect a
significant number of responses to ensure validity. The accepted polling size is at least 1,000
respondents (Asher 15). All of the polls that are used for this thesis used random digit dialing
telephone interviews, so there is no chance that the respondents selected themselves. Also, most
of the polls used have over 1,000 respondents and those that do not are highly criticized.
One of the trickiest aspects of achieving a valid representative poll is making sure that the
wording and selection choices do not greatly influence the respondents. When using multiple

Cerreta 23
polls, it is important to select ones with questions that have very similar wording. Asher explains
that by changing words in a question, respondents can be influenced to believe that they are
answering a different question than the original question (43). This thesis does use questions
from multiple polls to track opinions overtime. However, the polls were selected carefully so that
the questions contain wording that is as close to the same as possible. Asher also stressed the
importance of using questions that do not contain double negatives or ambiguity (44). For this
thesis, none of the questions contain double negatives and they are not ambiguous. All questions
ask whether the respondent favor or oppose legalizing same-sex marriage. The changes in
wording should not be significant enough to produce results that cannot be compared.
In addition, Asher explains that it is important to provide a middle answer for
respondents so that polls do not measure “nonattitudes.” He writes that polls produce
nonattitudes “if the topic is so remote from citizens’ concerns that they don’t hold a real view”
(Asher 26). If pollsters do not provide a middle choice or a “don’t know” category, respondents
might feel pressured to select an answer even though they have no true opinion on the question’s
topic. If this occurs, the results of the poll can be skewed toward one answer that might not
represent real public opinion. All of the poll questions that are used in this thesis include a “don’t
know” or “no opinion” choice. Therefore, there is less of a chance that the polls in this thesis
measured nonattitudes.
Overall, there are several types of polls and polling procedures that need to be avoided
for polls to be representative and accurate reflections of public opinion. Types of polls that
should be viewed with caution include commissioned polls, pseudo-polls, polls with small
sample sizes and self-selected polls. The polls used in this thesis avoid these pitfalls by being
conducted by media and news groups and using random digit dialing telephone interviews. It is
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also important for polls to use clear wording and provide a “don’t know” option for respondents.
The poll questions used in this thesis have similar wording and all provide an option to prevent
collecting nonattitudes. Although polls should be viewed with caution the ones used in this thesis
were conducted properly. Therefore, these polls can be used to evaluate the impact of the
majority’s opinion on legislatures’ choices of whether to legalize same-sex marriage.
Overall I use case law of the doctrinal development of the Equal Protection Clause and
right to privacy to determine where the constitutional right to same-sex marriage can be found. I
will use case studies of three states to test Dworkin’s theory that the courts should be responsible
for recognizing rights. The next section provides a brief history of the Equal Protection Clause
and the levels of scrutiny the Court has created to review cases dealing with possible Equal
Protection Clause violations.

Introduction to the Equal Protection Clause
Since the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, the protections guaranteed by the
Equal Protection Clause have been applied in varying degrees by the Supreme Court. David
O’Brien explains in Constitutional Law and Politics: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, that after
the Equal Protection Clause was initiated into the Constitution, “Over a half century lapsed
before the Supreme Court began enforcing it as a serious barrier to racial segregation and other
kinds of nonracial discrimination as well” (1325). O’Brien explains the Court has had to
determine what level of scrutiny should be given to laws discriminating against various minority
groups (1325). The Court originally used heightened scrutiny, or strict review of government
legislation, to judge cases pertaining to economic legislation. In United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 US 144 (1938), Justice Harlan Stone created the foundation for the differing

Cerreta 25
levels of protections under the Equal Protection Clause when he ruled that economic legislation
would no longer receive heightened scrutiny, but instead would need to serve some rational basis
(at 155). He suggested that heightened scrutiny of laws should be reserved for legislation that
impacted the fundamental rights of certain minority groups (United States v. Carolene Products
Co. 1938, 155). Justice Stone’s analysis of the Equal Protection Clause led to the classification
system in which laws dealing with “suspect classifications” receive heightened scrutiny while the
government must merely show a rational basis for other laws (United States v. Carolene
Products Co. 1938, 155).
The strict scrutiny test was not applied to a court opinion until the case Korematsu v.
United States (1944) in which Justice Hugo Black used the strict scrutiny test to uphold the
internment of Japanese-Americans (at 224). In the opinion, Justice Black explains that legislation
that limits the rights of a racial group should receive the highest level of review. However, he
found that under the strict scrutiny test the government had a compelling interest in the
internment of Japanese-Americans and that it was the narrowest way to implement that interest
(at 224). Therefore, although generally the government is unable to pass the strict scrutiny test, in
this first case, the government’s legislation was found to be valid law.
From 1953-1969, the Warren Court continued to develop Justice Stone’s original
groundwork for analyzing the Equal Protection Clause. The Warren Court focused on a two level
test to determine if legislation was constitutional (O’Brien 1328). According to O’Brien, the
Warren Court decided that “when reviewing economic legislation, the Court gives minimal
scrutiny and applies the rational basis test, asking simply whether legislation is reasonable and
has a rational, conceivable basis” (1328). However, when the Court reviewed cases that dealt
with “suspect classifications” such as race and religion, strict scrutiny was applied (O’Brien
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1329). It is much more difficult for the government to pass the strict scrutiny test because it must
demonstrate a compelling state interest in the law and that the law is narrowly tailored to
achieving that state interest. The Burger Court, which lasted from 1969 to 1986, added a third
standard that lies between strict scrutiny and the rational basis test to the Warren Court’s original
two tiered test (O’Brien 1332). Under this intermediate test, the government must show an
important interest in the law and that the law is substantially related to that interest. This middle
standard applies to gender minority groups (O’Brien 1332). Therefore, the Equal Protection
Clause has evolved to be analyzed by the Court according to these three tests, based on what
minority group’s rights are in question and whether a fundamental constitutional right is being
violated.
When the Court has faced cases concerning the violation of the rights of sexual
minorities, it has historically used the rational basis test to determine whether a government law
is constitutional. Therefore, sexual minorities receive the lowest level of protection from
government laws that infringe on their rights. This means that when looking at the government’s
prohibition of same-sex marriage, the government must merely prove that there is a legitimate
interest in not allowing same-sex couples to marry and that laws prohibiting gay marriage are
rationally related that interest. The following sections consider two cases in which the Court has
ruled respective state governmental laws have violated the Equal Protection Clause. The
doctrinal development, as illustrated in these cases, demonstrates how the right to same-sex
marriage exists under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Analysis of Loving v. Virginia (1967)
The case that is most often cited as legal precedent for the existence of a right to samesex marriage is the 1967 Supreme Court decision Loving v. Virginia. In Loving, the Supreme
Court found that a Virginia law prohibiting interracial marriages violated interracial couples’
rights under the Equal Protection Clause (at 13). The connections between this case and the
argument for same-sex marriage are obvious. Both Loving and the legal arguments for same-sex
marriage deal with the government denying an established fundamental right to a minority group.
These connections lead legal scholars and same-sex marriage activists to cite Loving as
precedent for a right to gay marriage. In Loving, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard
Loving, a white man, argued that Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute violated the Constitution.
Mildred Loving has made connections between her particular legal battle and the battle over
same-sex marriage. She issued a statement in 2007 saying, “I believe all Americans, no matter
their race, no matter their sex, no matter their sexual orientation, should have that same freedom
to marry” (Nussbaum 48)1. Although the connections between Loving and same-sex marriage
appear clear, there are certain distinctions between the two issues. In particular, race is a suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause and receives a greater level of protection from
government laws than minorities of sexual orientation. Therefore, analysis of the written decision
and oral arguments of this case show how the legal reasoning used in Loving creates a definitive
legal argument for same-sex marriage.
In the unanimous decision, the Court ruled that Virginia’s law prohibiting interracial
marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause. In the written opinion of the Court, Chief Justice
Earl Warren writes, “There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because
1

Richard Loving was killed in 1975 by a drunk driver. Therefore, he was not included in this
statement that Mildred made in 2007 (Sullivan).
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of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause” (Loving v.
Virginia 1967, at13). In the case, the state attempted to argue that because the law applied
equally to white and black participants in an interracial marriage, there was no Equal Protection
Clause violation. Summarizing Virginia’s argument Chief Justice Warren writes, “The State
contends that, because its miscegenation statutes punish equally both the white and the Negro
participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance on racial
classifications, do not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon race” (Loving v.
Virginia 1967, at 9). The state rested this argument on the Virginia Supreme Court case Naim v.
Naim (1965). In the case, it was ruled that a Virginia couple’s interracial marriage violated
Virginia’s antimiscegenation laws and that the laws served a legitimate state interest. The
Virginia Supreme Court cited “preserving the racial integrity of its citizens, preventing the
corruption of blood and the obliteration of racial pride” as legitimate reasons for the prohibition
of interracial marriages (Loving v. Virginia 1967, at 8). In Loving, Virginia cited these arguments
as rationale for why the laws could be upheld under the Equal Protection Clause.
The Supreme Court did not find these arguments to be sufficient justification for the
law’s infringement on a suspect class’s fundamental right to marry. Chief Justice Warren’s
decision makes it clear that race is given the highest level of scrutiny and that Virginia’s
argument that the law punishes races equally is not an adequate argument when dealing with the
Equal Protection Clause. He writes that in Loving “we deal with statutes containing racial
classifications, and the fact of equal application does not immunize the statute from the very
heavy burden of justification…required of state statutes drawn according to race” (at 10). In the
opinion, the Court does not support Virginia’s use of Naim as legal precedent. Chief Justice
Warren writes that the government interests that the Naim decision gives for prohibiting
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interracial marriages are “obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy”
(Loving v. Virginia 1967, at 8). He goes on to write that the Court has historically established
that marriage is one of the most basic fundamental rights and that the denial of interracial
marriage infringes upon that fundamental right for no legitimate reason. He writes, “Marriage is
one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival” (Loving v.
Virginia 1967, at 13). Therefore, the Court concludes that the Virginia law violates the Equal
Protection Clause and that states must allow interracial marriages.
The written opinion in this case connects to the legal reasoning often given for the
existence of a right to same-sex marriage. Although sexual orientation does not receive
heightened scrutiny, other connections exist between the written opinion and the right to samesex marriage. Specifically, states often claim that prohibition of same-sex marriage does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause because it applies equally to both genders. In essence the
argument is that men cannot marry men and women cannot marry women. However, Chief
Justice Warren makes it clear in his opinion that the equal protection requirement is not met
merely because each race, or in this case each gender, is punished equally. This legal precedent
suggests that Equal Protection Clause violations can still exist even when laws apply to groups of
citizens equally.
Also, connections can be made to Justice Warren’s explanation that marriage is a
fundamental right. Fundamental rights are given a greater level of protection under the Equal
Protection Clause. Therefore, it would seem that when considering the right to same-sex
marriage, the courts must be willing to use stricter scrutiny. Evan Gerstmann makes the
argument that because marriage is a historically established fundamental right, it is improper of
the courts to allow the legislatures to deny minority groups this right. He explains, “The Supreme
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Court has consistently recognized the right to marry as a fundamental right. So this right should
be applied equally among all people” (Gerstmann 26). Therefore, although the Court relied on
heightened scrutiny in this case and sexual minorities do not receive heightened scrutiny, there
are several elements of the legal reasoning used by the Court to find an Equal Protection Clause
violation that relate to same-sex marriage.
Similarities can also be found between the oral arguments of Loving and the arguments
made to support same-sex marriage. Particularly, the references to the rights and protections that
are denied to interracial couples mirror the rights and protections that are denied to same-sex
couples. By prohibiting certain groups of people from marrying, the government is unequally
allowing and disallowing certain citizens’ access to the rights that stem from marriage. When
arguing the case for the Lovings, attorney Philip Hirschkop explains that if the Lovings were to
live in Virginia where their marriage is not recognized “they themselves would lose their rights
for insurance and social security” (Loving v. Virginia “Oral Arguments”). He explains that by not
allowing interracial couples to seek the benefits of marriage, Virginia is holding them in an
inferior economic position to couples of the same race. Referring to the antimiscegenation laws
he says, “And that’s what they’re meant to do. To hold the Negro class in a lower position. A
lower social position, a lower economic position” (Loving v. Virginia “Oral Arguments”). The
same argument can be made for couples of the same-sex who wish to get married but are unable
to because the government does not allow them to. Kory Schaff makes this point when he writes,
“State and federal legislation that defines marriage in heterosexual terms precludes certain
individuals from participating in an institution that imparts legal benefits and burdens” (139). In
“The Case For Gay Marriage” Richard Mohr points out several of the rights that same-sex
couples are being denied including income tax advantages, rights of inheritance, right to bring a
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wrongful death suit, right to receive survivor’s benefits, right to obtain residency status for a
noncitizen partner, and the right to unemployment benefits if one partner quits and they have to
move to a new location (228). Similarly to how the denial of interracial marriages prohibited
interracial couples from receiving these rights, the prohibition of same-sex marriage prevents
same-sex couples from receiving the full spectrum of rights they should be fundamentally
allowed to obtain.
Lastly, in the oral arguments of Loving, attorney R.D. Mcllwaine argues for Virginia that
the antimiscegenation laws serve a legitimate government purpose. In his argument he cites
scientific evidence by Albert I. Gordon that claims that interracial marriages create greater
amounts of stress on the partners and on the children of interracial marriages. Talking about
Albert Gordon’s theories Mcllwaine says, “His view as a social scientist is that interracial
marriages are definitely undesirable, that they hold no promise for a bright and happy future for
mankind” (Loving v. Virginia “Oral Arguments”). Mcllwaine argues that people who enter into
interracial marriages are “people who have a rebellious attitude toward society, self hatred,
neurotic tendencies, immaturity and other detrimental psychological factors,” (Loving v. Virginia
“Oral Arguments"). Therefore, he claims that Virginia has an interest in preventing the inevitable
decline in society that would result from interracial marriages.
A similar argument is made today concerning same-sex marriage. However, the most
recent scientific evidence suggests that same-sex couples provide just as a stable family life as
opposite-sex couples. For example, the American Psychological Association cites research
conducted by University of Virginia Professor Charlotte J. Patterson, PhD, and co-authors UVA
Doctoral Student Rachel H. Farr and Stephen L. Forssell, PhD, of George Washington
University. Their study of children in same-sex and opposite-sex households found that “the
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children of gays and lesbians were virtually indistinguishable from children of heterosexual
parents” (Munsey “Adopted Children Thrive”). Additionally, the American Medical Association,
the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Academy of Family Physicians, the
American Psychoanalytical Association and the National Association of Social Workers all
support same-sex marriage due to scientific research their organizations have conducted. The
question of whether same-sex marriage is detrimental to stable family life and the welfare of
children will be addressed further in this thesis in the section challenging the government’s
ability to pass the rational basis test for prohibiting same-sex marriage. However, for now, it is
clear that connections exist between the arguments used for the government’s interest in
prohibiting interracial marriages and same-sex marriages. So far, there are clear connections
between the legal reasoning behind the Court’s decision in Loving concerning the violation of the
Equal Protection Clause and the arguments made for the legalization of same-sex marriage.
Now, this thesis analyzes another Equal Protection Clause case, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).

Analysis of Romer v. Evans (1996)
The 1996 case Romer v. Evans dealt with an amendment to the Colorado State
Constitution and its potential violation of the minority rights of homosexual, lesbian and bisexual
Colorado residents under the Equal Protection Clause (at 624). The amendment, known as
Amendment 2, forbid any level of Colorado Government from taking actions designed to protect
Colorado citizens of homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation from discrimination based on
their sexual orientation, conduct, or relationships (Romer v. Evans 1996, at 627). The
constitutionality of Amendment 2 was challenged. The Supreme Court ruled in a 6-3 decision
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that Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause rights of sexual minorities because it
served no legitimate government purpose (Romer v. Evans 1996, at 626). Romer connects to the
issue of same-sex marriage because it provides a case in which a government law that
discriminated against sexual minorities did not pass the rational basis test. Although the case
does not deal directly with the right to marriage, it provides an example of the legal reasoning
used to show that the government can violate the constitutional rights of sexual minorities.
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court. In his decision, he explains
that Colorado defends Amendment 2 by claiming that it places sexual minorities on the same
level as all other Colorado residents by making sure that people of homosexual, lesbian and
bisexual orientation do not receive special treatment from the state (Romer v. Evans 1996, at
626). However, he writes, “This reading of the amendment's language is implausible” (Romer v.
Evans 1996, at 626). Justice Kennedy points out that the law unfairly denies sexual minorities
the ability to seek a remedy for discrimination they experience in the state. He comments on this
when he writes, “The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal
protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws
and policies” (Romer v. Evans 1996, at 627). He expresses the Court’s concern at the breadth of
the language of Amendment 2. He explains that Amendment 2 repeals laws set in place against
discrimination in government positions and in state colleges (Romer v Evans 1996, at 627). He
also does not agree with Colorado’s suggestion that the state is simply denying same-sex couples
“special rights” when he writes, “To the contrary, the amendment imposes a special disability
upon those persons alone. Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may
seek without constraint” (Romer v. Evans 1996, at 631). Here, he notes that any other minority
group has the ability to seek protection against discrimination but Amendment 2 prevents only
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gay Coloradans from seeking protections. This, the Court believes is in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
The Court concludes that Colorado can provide no legitimate government interest for
Amendment 2 and thus, it violates the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Kennedy explains, “We
will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate
end. Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry” (Romer v. Evans 1996, at
632). He goes on to say that Amendment 2 is an attempt to discriminate against sexual
minorities. In the closing arguments of Romer, Justice Kennedy writes, “We must conclude that
Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them
unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do” (at 635). Therefore, this case provides a
clear legal example of a situation in which the government lacks a legitimate state interest in
regulating the ability of sexual minorities to seek protection from discrimination.
This legal argument connects directly to the argument for the existence of a right to
same-sex marriage. Many proponents of same-sex marriage argue that the government’s
prohibition of the right only serves the purpose of treating same-sex couples as unequal to
opposite-sex couples. Richard Mohr makes this argument when he claims that the courts need to
recognize that the definition of marriage has evolved. He writes that “The law, if it aims at
promoting justice, will have to be attentive to the ways couples actually live their lives rather
than, as at present, preemptively and ignorantly determining which relationships are to be
acknowledged and even created by it” (Mohr 218). Therefore, connections exist between the
argument in Romer that the government cannot unequally deny sexual minorities’ access to
government protections and the government’s unequal denial of marriage to sexual minorities.
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Not all the Supreme Court Justices agreed with the decision in Romer. Justice Scalia
wrote a dissenting opinion which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined. In his
dissent, Justice Scalia explains that he believes that Colorado had a legitimate interest in creating
Amendment 2 to prevent sexual minorities from receiving any form of special treatment from the
state (Romer v. Evans 1996, at 638). He goes on to say that moral disapproval can be a legitimate
reason for the law. He writes that Amendment 2 merely shows “moral disapproval of
homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral disapproval that produced the centuries old criminal
laws that we held constitutional in Bowers” (Romer v. Evans 1996, at 644). Ten years earlier in
Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), the Court upheld states’ right to outlaw homosexual sodomy (at
196). Justice Scalia explains that because homosexual sodomy can be outlawed according to the
Bowers decision, he does not see why a law “disfavoring” sexual minorities would be
unconstitutional (Romer v. Evans 1996, at 644).
Justice Scalia also states that Amendment 2 was passed because several cities in
Colorado with large gay populations passed ordinances that placed discrimination based on
sexual orientation on the same grounds at religious and racial discrimination (Romer v. Evans
1996, at 646). In the oral arguments for Romer Scalia even addressed this as a legitimate interest
when the attorney for Colorado was asked what the interest of the state was. Justice Scalia says,
“State... State subdivisions giving preferences which the majority of the people in the State did
not think desirable for social reasons, isn't that the problem that was seen?” (Romer v. Evans
“Oral Arguments”). Here, Justice Scalia helps make the argument for the attorney for the state.
Justice Scalia saw Amendment 2 as a protection against the advancement of minority rights that
the majority in Colorado did not support. Therefore, Justice Scalia, along with Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, did not support the Romer ruling.
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Interestingly, Justice Scalia’s argument that Colorado needed to pass Amendment 2 to
ensure the will of the majority supports Ronald Dworkin’s theory. Justice Scalia states that a
majority of Colorado residents did not support sexual minorities passing legislation that ensured
their rights against discrimination. Therefore, the majority took its own legislative route to deny
gay, lesbian and bisexual individuals their rights. Then, through the Romer decision, the Court
recognized and protected the minority rights. According to Dworkin, this is the exact process that
results from a majority of citizens being unwilling to recognize the rights of minorities. Although
Justice Scalia might see precedent for allowing legislation to be passed on moral grounds,
Amendment 2 was completely unprecedented in the way that it removed from a whole group of
citizens the basic right to be free from discrimination. Therefore, the Court fulfilled its duty to
protect minority rights and found that the law did not pass the lowest level of scrutiny. There are
several parallels between Romer and the case for same-sex marriage including the government’s
denial of the protections and rights it gives to other citizens and the government’s inability to
provide a legitimate interest in the law other than moral disapproval.

Conclusion to the Equal Protection Clause
Overall, there seems to be sound legal footing in the doctrinal development of the Equal
Protection Clause that relates closely to the legal arguments made for same-sex marriage.
Although there are distinct differences between the levels of scrutiny used when concerning
racial minorities and sexual minorities, Loving still provides clear legal connections to the
existence of a right to same-sex marriage. These connections include the lack of support for
many states’ argument that laws pass the Equal Protection Clause if they punish those within a
group equally. A connection also exists between the way interracial couples once were unequally
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denied the benefits received from marriage and the way same-sex couples are currently denied
those benefits. Lastly, there is a connection between the lack of support for the government’s
arguments that an interest exists in prohibiting interracial and same-sex marriages. There are also
connections between the use of the Equal Protection Clause in Romer and the argument made for
the legalization of same-sex marriage. Specifically, in Romer the Court made clear that if the
government does not have a legitimate interest in a law concerning the rights of sexual
minorities; it violates the Equal Protection Clause. The reluctance of Americans to accept samesex marriage because of a disapproval of the minority group connects to Amendment 2’s unequal
treatment of people of homosexual, lesbian and bisexual orientation because of homophobia.
Therefore, legal connections exist between the development of the Equal Protection Clause and
the argument for same-sex marriage.

Introduction to the Right to Privacy
The right to privacy is a controversial legal doctrine because unlike most established
legal rights, it is not explicitly stated in the Constitution. Since the right to privacy was not
openly written into the Constitution, many lawyers, legal scholars, politicians and judges have
questioned the right’s very existence. Nevertheless, today scholars argue that the right to samesex marriage is established under the constitutional right to privacy. However, in order to
understand the inaccuracy of this argument, it is necessary to detail the history of the right to
privacy and its doctrinal development. Once the controversy of this right is better understood, it
is easier to make the argument that same-sex marriage is a right that is founded in the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution rather than the right to privacy.
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Since a right to privacy is not clearly written in the Constitution, it took time for the right
to be recognized by the Supreme Court. The two attorneys who have been accredited most often
for conceptualizing the right to privacy are Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. In 1890, Warren
and Brandeis wrote “The Right to Privacy” which was published in the Harvard Law Review
(Warren 193). In the article, Warren and Brandeis explain that initially, the law only recognized
a physical right from intrusion by the government in matters of life and property (193). They
outline that previous legal cases involving publication of literary and photographic works have
been decided based on the right to property. However, they write that “although the courts have
asserted that they rested their decisions on the narrow grounds of protection to property…there
are recognitions of a more liberal doctrine” (204). They go on to explain that the more liberal
doctrine is the right to privacy. They note that as society evolves, the law regarding privacy
should also evolve to protect the ways that people enjoy their personal lives. They write, “The
design of the law must be to protect those persons with whose affairs the community has no
legitimate concern, from being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity…” (214).
Thus, Warren and Brandeis believed that the right to life and property extended to a “man’s
spiritual nature” and that the right to privacy had naturally evolved due to the evolution of legal
doctrine (194).
Brandeis went on to become a Supreme Court Justice and wrote a dissenting opinion in
the case Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In his dissent, he made it clear that he
opposed the decision by the Court to uphold the United States Government’s use of wiretapped
private conversations as evidence without the consent of the person being wiretapped (at 488).
Justice Brandeis saw this as a violation of privacy and an unnecessary government intrusion.
Therefore, during his time on the Supreme Court, Brandeis continued to outline the evolution of
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a right to privacy. Through “The Right to Privacy” and Brandeis’s work on the Supreme Court,
the two men outlined the intellectual reasoning for a right to privacy.
It was not until Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), that the Supreme Court
fully recognized a constitutional right to privacy. Justice William Douglas wrote the majority
opinion which explained that the right to privacy can be found in the “prenumbras” of the Bill of
Rights (Griswold v. Connecticut 1965, 484). Therefore, the Court decided that the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments imply that there exists a fundamental right to
privacy between married couples that the states cannot violate (Griswold v. Connecticut 1965,
484). Particularly, the Due Process Clause found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
requires that no citizen be denied life, liberty or property without due process of the law (U.S.
Const, amend XIV). The Founding Fathers’ use of the word liberty is often used to make the
case that they had sought to guarantee a right to privacy. However, Justice Black and Justice
Stewart both wrote dissenting opinions in Griswold in which they chastised the Court for
creating a right that they believed did not exist (at 508). Since this case, justices have disagreed
over whether a right to privacy truly exists in the Constitution. Nevertheless, the right to privacy
was extended in Roe v. Wade (1973), in which the Court ruled that the right of a woman to
choose to have an abortion based on her trimester falls under the realm of privacy (at 165-166).
Continuing the controversy of this right, in Roe Justices White and Rehnquist both wrote
dissenting opinions in which they stated that the right to privacy does not exist because it is not
written in the Constitution.
The right to privacy and what it entails has been debated throughout much of the past one
hundred years of Supreme Court history. Despite its controversy, some legal scholars claim that
the right to same-sex marriage exists under the right to privacy. These authors claim that the
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choice of whom to marry is a private domestic matter that the United States Government does
not have the right to invade. Two common cases that are cited as legal precedent for the right to
same-sex marriage include the previously mentioned case, Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), and
the Supreme Court case Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Griswold lays the foundation
for a fundamental right to privacy between married couples which could possibly also apply to
the choice of who a person wishes to marry. Lawrence directly deals with the right to privacy
between people of gay or lesbian orientation. Although the right to privacy might appear to be a
legal pathway to establish a right to same-sex marriage, this thesis argues that this argument is
riddle with legal problems that make the Equal Protection Clause the legal doctrine that most
accurately establishes a right to same-sex marriage.

Analysis of Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)
Griswold v. Connecticut was a 1965 Supreme Court case that directly dealt with a
married couple’s right to make private decisions about procreation and family life without the
unnecessary interference of the Connecticut Government. Prior to the case, Estelle Griswold, the
director of a Connecticut Planned Parenthood Clinic, and Dr. Buxton, the physician of the clinic,
provided married women with advice and encouragement on how to use birth control. According
to a Connecticut law at the time, it was illegal for anyone to use birth control and for anyone to
encourage or advise someone to commit a crime (Griswold v. Connecticut 1965, at 480).
Therefore, since Griswold and Buxton had advised women to commit the crime of using birth
control, they were found guilty of counseling someone to commit a crime (Griswold v.
Connecticut 1965, at 480). Griswold appealed claiming that the laws violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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In its majority opinion, the Court ruled for Griswold. The opinion was written by Justice
Douglas and it contains much of the legal reasoning behind the Court’s recognition of a right to
privacy. In the Griswold opinion, Justice Douglas quickly notes that although the case concerns
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause it is not closely related to previous cases that
have dealt with economic liberty because the Connecticut law “operates directly on an intimate
relation of husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation” (at 482).
Instead of looking towards meanings of liberty based on economics and property, Justice
Douglas explains that First Amendment cases such as Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), Meyer
v. Nebraska (1923) and NAACP v. Alabama (1958) have established a “prenumbra” where
privacy is protected (Griswold v. Connecticut 1965, at 483). In Griswold he writes, “The
foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance” (at 484). He explains
that the prenumbras of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment “create
sanctity of man’s home and privacy” (Griswold v. Connecticut 1965, at 484). Thus, through the
use of several constitutional guarantees, Justice Douglas outlines the Court’s legal doctrine of the
right to privacy.
An argument can be made that the guarantee to martial privacy established in Griswold
should also apply to the choice of whom a person wishes to marry. William Hohengarten
explains, “The right of privacy prevents the state from taking over the lives of individual citizens
by making basic familial decisions for them” (1523). Based on this idea, the case could be made
that same-sex couples have a right to privacy in determining who they wish to bond their lives
with through marriage and who they want to make members of their family. In Justice Douglas’s
opinion, he explains that family choices are one of the deepest matters of privacy that a man can
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have. He passionately outlines this idea when he writes, “Would we allow the police to search
the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very
idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship” (Griswold v.
Connecticut 1965, at 485-486). According to this line of thought, it can be argued that same-sex
couples deserve that same sacred quality of marriage that opposite-sex couples so freely enjoy.
However, other than the quote above by Justice Douglas, there is little evidence in the
majority opinion that the martial right to privacy should extend to the choice of who to marry. In
fact, there is more evidence proving the contrary in the concurring opinion by Justice Goldberg.
In his concurring opinion he writes that there are certain circumstances in which states can
regulate marriages. He writes, “Finally, it should be said of the Court's holding today that it in no
way interferes with a State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct” (Griswold v.
Connecticut 1965, at 499-500). To make his argument he cites the previous Supreme Court
ruling dealing with the Connecticut contraception laws that Griswold overturned, Poe v. Ullman
(1961). When referring to the Poe case he quotes Justice Harlan’s dissent which says, “Adultery,
homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State forbids . . . , but the intimacy of
husband and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the institution of
marriage…” (Griswold v. Connecticut 1996, at 500). Therefore, by citing Justice Harlan’s
dissent, Justice Goldberg suggests that the state does have the complete right to regulate
marriage in particular situations, including same-sex marriage. The majority opinion does not
state that the right to privacy created in Griswold protects couples from government intrusion
into the choice of whom to marry. Also, Justice Goldberg makes clear that he believes that the
state has every right to regulate marriage, including when the couple that wishes to marry is a
gay couple. The dissenting opinions for Griswold, written by Justice Black and Justice Stewart,
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claim that the right to privacy does not exist under the Constitution. Clearly, if no right to
privacy exists, then these Justices would not support the legal reasoning that the right to privacy
creates a right to same-sex marriage.
In his dissent, Justice Black objects to what he believes is the Court’s eagerness to
prevent the state from passing any laws that might deny privacy in necessary situations. He
comments on this when he writes that “The Court talks about a constitutional ‘right of privacy’
as though there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be
passed which might abridge the ‘privacy’ of individuals. But there is not” (Griswold v.
Connecticut 1996, at 508). He explains that since no constitutional provision exists that even
mentions a right to privacy, the government has every constitutional right to intrude into the lives
of Americans (Griswold v. Connecticut 1996, at 510). Without question this includes the right to
have the discretion in determining who may and may not get married. Justice Stewart also writes
that he does not believe that a right to privacy exists. He makes this obvious when he writes,
“With all deference, I can find no such general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other
part of the Constitution, or in any case ever before decided by this Court” (Griswold v.
Connecticut 1996, at 530). Clearly, Justice Stewart believes that because no language in the
Constitution describes a right to privacy, there is no right to privacy.
The lack of support in the majority opinion for extending the right to privacy to include
the right to same-sex marriage is not surprising considering that the Griswold case was decided
in the 1960s. In addition, the concurring opinion demonstrates that Justice Goldberg believed
that the state had every right intrude into certain realms of privacy including the realm of who
can marry. In the oral arguments of the case, Attorney for the State of Connecticut Joseph Clark
makes this argument as well. In oral arguments Justice Stewart questions Mr. Clark about
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whether the State of Connecticut could prevent marriage. In response Mr. Clark says, “I think the
State of Connecticut could prevent marriage in certain people, certain groups, yes” (Griswold v.
Connecticut Oyez). Although he does not specifically mention gay couples, Mr. Clark’s
argument is supported by Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion. Thus, it seems that certain
Justices were not convinced that the state should be completely restricted in the private realm of
marriage. Also, the dissenting opinions in the case reveal that the right to privacy is a highly
controversial right that many Justices throughout Supreme Court history have not believed
exists. Due to all these factors, it is fairly risky to make the claim that the legal doctrine of the
right to privacy created in Griswold provides the legal foundation for a right to same-sex
marriage.

Analysis of Lawrence v. Texas (2003)
Thirty-eight years after Griswold, the Supreme Court case Lawrence v. Texas (2003)
furthered the doctrinal development of the right to privacy. Some legal scholars (see Feigen and
Hohengarten) argue that the ruling in Lawrence provides the constitutional foundation for a right
to same-sex marriage. This argument is greatly advanced by the fact that in Justice Scalia’s
dissent he claims that if the legal theory in the written opinion in Lawrence is accepted, then the
legality of same-sex marriage must also be accepted. However, most existing literature on the
subject argues that although certain parallels can be drawn between the right to privacy in this
case and the right to same-sex marriage, the written opinion makes clear distinctions between
private and public conduct. These authors argue that because marriage is publicly created and
maintained by the government, the right to privacy does not extend to same-sex marriage.
Analysis of the written opinion, the concurring opinion, the dissent and the oral arguments in

Cerreta 45
Lawrence show that marriage does not hold enough parallels with private consensual sexual
conduct to establish a right to same-sex marriage.
In the case of Lawrence, two men had been found in a bedroom of a home engaging in
consensual sexual conduct. The men’s actions violated a Texas statute which criminalized two
people of the same-sex engaging in “deviate” sexual intercourse (Lawrence v. Texas 2003, at
563). The two men challenged the law claiming that it violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment (Lawrence v. Texas 2003, at 558). Prior to Lawrence the Supreme Court
had decided a comparable case, Bowers v. Hardwick (1986). In Bowers, Michael Hardwick was
arrested for violating a Georgia law criminalizing sodomy between people of the same sex. The
Supreme Court upheld the Georgia law claiming that there is a longstanding history of
criminalizing sexual conduct between people of the same-sex and that a right to privacy does not
extend to homosexual sodomy (Bowers v. Hardwick 1986, at 191). Therefore, when the Supreme
Court decided Lawrence there was clear legal precedent that did not identify a private right to
sexual conduct between homosexuals. Nevertheless, through Lawrence the Court voted to
overturn Bowers and to identify a right to privacy for people of the same sex to engage in
consensual sexual conduct.
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court. In the written opinion he states
that the law violates the Due Process Clause and that Bowers is overturned. He explains that the
personal choice of engaging in consensual sexual acts is one of the most private matters of
human life. He comments on this when he writes about the Georgia law in Bowers and the Texas
law saying:
Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching
upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places,
the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not
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entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without
being punished as criminals. (Lawrence v. Texas 2003, at 567).
This quote demonstrates that when deciding this case, the majority of the Court believed that
Americans should be able to engage in sexual intimacy within the home and retain their pride
outside of their home no matter their sexual orientation. Justice Kennedy goes on to explain that
the Texas law seems to merely be a moral judgment that the majority in Texas wishes to impose
on a sexual minority. In the Lawrence opinion he writes about gay men and lesbian women that
“the State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime” (at 578). Therefore, the Court made its decision based on the idea that the
Constitution protects the liberty of citizens to engage in private consensual sexual activity no
matter their sexual orientation.
In his opinion, Justice Kennedy also addressed why the Court overturned Bowers.
Particularly, he explained that the Bowers decision had been made based on a false idea that
America has had a longstanding tradition of criminalizing homosexual sodomy. In Bowers, the
Court states that there are “ancient roots” in prohibiting sexual conduct between people of the
same sex (Bowers v. Hardwick 1986, at 191). Justice Kennedy points to amicus briefs which
contain academic writings that question that accuracy of the historical account that is given in the
majority opinion in Bowers (Lawrence v. Texas 2003, at 567). He explains that the history of
laws concerning homosexual sodomy is not as extensive as the majority in Bowers suggested.
Instead, he claims that “American laws targeting same-sex couples did not develop until the last
third of the 20th century” (Lawrence v. Texas 2003, at 570). In Lawrence he also notes that the
number of states that criminalized homosexual sodomy had almost been cut in half since the
Bowers decision (at 570). Justice Kennedy suggests in his writing that homosexuality was
becoming more accepted in American society and that because of that, certain laws that were
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once thought necessary “serve only to oppress” (Lawrence v. Texas 2003, at 579). Although the
Court often relies heavily on its decisions from previous cases, in this particular case, the Court
believed Bowers was bad precedent and overturned it.
One member of the Court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, voted with the majority but
wrote a concurring opinion in which she agreed with the outcome of the case but did not agree
with the reasoning. In her opinion, Justice O’Connor states that she does not believe that Bowers
should be overturned or that Lawrence should have been decided based on the question of
whether the Texas statute violated the Due Process Clause. Instead, she believes that the law
violates the Equal Protection Clause (Lawrence v. Texas 2003, at 579). She explains this when
she writes, “The Texas statute makes homosexuals unequal in the eyes of the law by making
particular conduct-and only that conduct-subject to criminal sanction” (Lawrence v. Texas 2003,
at 581). Therefore, she sees the law as unfairly applying a criminal law to a minority of the
population. Justice O’Connor writes that the only interest that Texas has given for prohibiting
certain sexual acts between people of the same sex is an interest in the morality of its citizens.
However, she does not believe morality is a legitimate state interest in this case. She makes this
clear when she writes, “Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is
an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause”
(Lawrence v. Texas 2003, at 582). Therefore, although Justice O’Connor agrees that the law is
unconstitutional, she believes that it violates the Equal Protection Clause because it signals out a
minority group without a legitimate interest in doing so.
Some legal scholars might argue that Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion naturally
connects to the argument to legalize same-sex marriage. It seems that if Justice O’Connor
believes that the government cannot create laws merely based on morality claims, then she could
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not agree with at least a portion of the government’s argument for prohibiting same-sex
marriage. However, these scholars would be mistaken. In her concurring opinion, Justice
O’Connor clearly states that her legal argument in Lawrence does not pave the way for the
legalization of same-sex marriage. She writes:
That this law as applied to private, consensual conduct is unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause does not mean that other laws distinguishing between
heterosexuals and homosexuals would similarly fail under rational basis review. Texas
cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such as national security or preserving the
traditional institution of marriage. Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations-the
asserted state interest in this case-other reasons exist to promote the institution of
marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group. (Lawrence v. Texas
2003, at 585).
Therefore, Justice O’Connor clearly believes that the government has a legitimate interest in
regulating marriage and she made a point to write this in her opinion.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent for Lawrence which Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas joined. In his dissent, Justice Scalia disagreed with both
the written opinion and Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion. Concerning the majority
opinion, Justice Scalia believes that numerous cases throughout America’s history have upheld
morality as a legitimate reason to regulate conduct, including sexual conduct (Lawrence v. Texas
2003, at 589). He goes on to write that he believes that the majority decision is especially
dangerous because it strikes down several laws regulating certain conduct that are based on a
moral interest. Conduct that he believes is prohibited based on a moral reason include “state laws
against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication,
bestiality, and obscenity” (Lawrence v. Texas 2003, at 590). Of particular interest to this thesis is
Justice Scalia’s claim that the Lawrence decision creates the foundation for the legalization of
same-sex marriage. Referring to law regulating the conduct listed above he writes, “If, as the
Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality is not even a legitimate state
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interest, none of the above-mentioned laws can survive rational-basis review” (Lawrence v.
Texas 2003, at 599). Thus, in his dissenting opinion Justice Scalia states that he believes that the
majority opinion suggests that moral laws must be abolished and therefore, laws prohibiting
same-sex marriage should be abolished.
Justice Scalia also believes that Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion provides legal
reasoning for allowing same-sex marriage. He believes that the preservation of morality is a
legitimate government interest to prevent same-sex marriage. However, he states that since
Justice O’Connor does not believe that morality is a legitimate interest, she must conclude that
same-sex marriage should be legal. He explains that under her form of rational basis review any
statute that harms a politically unpopular group violates the Equal Protection Clause (Lawrence
v. Texas 2003, at 601). He goes on to criticize her idea that there is a legitimate interest in
prohibiting same-sex marriage based on traditional notion of marriage. He writes that
“‘preserving the traditional institution of marriage’ is just a kinder way of describing the State's
moral disapproval of same-sex couples” (Lawrence v. Texas 2003, at 601). Therefore, he sees
her argument as allowing for the government’s moral disapproval under the circumstance of
same-sex marriage but not under the circumstance of homosexual sodomy. He concludes that the
majority opinion and the concurring opinion leave a dangerous amount of freedom for the
legalization of same-sex marriage.
Although Justice Scalia saw clear connections between Lawrence and the legalization of
same-sex marriage, a majority of legal scholars have dismissed this argument. The main reason
is that the majority opinion clearly explains that sexual conduct is one of the most private matters
for Americans. However, it is difficult to say the same for marriage. Marriage has historically
been regulated and recognized by the United States Government. Therefore, there are some very
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public aspects of marriage that make it fall outside the same zone of privacy as sexual intimacy.
In “Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy” William Hohengarten makes this very
argument. Although Hohengarten ultimately concludes in his writing that a right to same-sex
marriage exists under the right to privacy, he plays devil’s advocate when he explains that
marriage is closely connected to the government. Hohengarten writes, “The right to marry is not
entirely unproblematic. It differs from other rights protected under the rubric of ‘privacy,’ such
as procreation, abortion, or child rearing, because marriage is not something that exists apart
from the law or the state” (1496).
Similarly to Hohengarten, Jonathan Rauch comments on the public nature of marriage in
“The Supreme Court Ruled For Privacy--Not For Gay Marriage.” He writes, “The whole point of
Lawrence is to curtail an unwarranted state intrusion into private conduct. You don't need a
blood test and a government license to have sex at home. By contrast, the whole point of statesanctioned marriage is that it is public” (Rauch). In the oral arguments for Lawrence, the
attorney fighting against the Texas law, Paul Smith also claimed that there could be legitimate
reasons for the government to regulate marriage, unlike homosexual sodomy. Smith says:
Now, bigamy involves protection of an institution that the State creates for its own
purposes and there are all sorts of potential justifications about the need to protect the
institution of marriage that are different in kind from the justifications that could be
offered here involving merely a criminal statute that says we're going to regulate these
peoples behaviors. (Lawrence v. Texas “Oral Arguments”).
In oral arguments, Smith was trying to convince the Court that there was a private right to
engage in sexual conduct but he did not believe that the same legal reasoning applied to
marriage. Therefore, because marriage is a more public institution, it does not seem like
Lawrence adequately applies to the issue of same-sex marriage.
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In “Comment: Landmark Decision or Limited Precedent?” Charles Mauney Jr. makes a
similar argument to Hohengarten and Rauch and also expands upon it. He explains that the
majority opinion in Lawrence “explicitly limited” its holding by constantly making reference to
the private nature of the sexual conduct (Mauney 162). He also makes a couple other distinctions
between the ruling in Lawrence and same-sex marriage. Mauney explains that Texas
criminalized homosexual sodomy but same-sex marriage is not criminalized (162). He believes
that this distinction is important because criminalizing an action carries much greater penalties
within the legal system and outside a society compared to a law that does not criminalize an
action. Therefore, he suggests that a law is more egregious if it criminalizes “private conduct in
violation of constitutional principles” (Mauney 162).
Mauney also explains that there is no lack of historical precedent in denying a right to
same-sex marriage (Mauney 167). Mauney writes, “In Lawrence, the Court set forth a number of
reasons for overruling Bowers v. Hardwick. An examination of traditional limitations of marriage
to opposite-sex couples, however, reveals a nearly complete absence of reasons similar to those
upon which Lawrence relied in overruling Bowers” (162). This same argument was made by
Justice Scalia in the oral arguments for Lawrence. He says that “…before we find a substantive
due process right, a fundamental liberty, we have to assure ourselves that that liberty was
objectively deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition” (Lawrence v. Texas “Oral
Arguments”). Although Justice Scalia is referring to the right to homosexual sodomy, the quote
also applies to the right to same-sex marriage. Mauney believes that there is no historical
precedent for a right to same-sex marriage just like how Scalia sees no precedent for a right to
homosexual sodomy. Therefore, Hohengarten, Rauch and Mauney all recognize that there are
too many gaps in the argument that the Lawrence decision created a right to same-sex marriage.
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Conclusion to the Right to Privacy
Lawrence might have given hope to same-sex marriage advocates that it could provide
the foundation for the legalization of same-sex marriage. However, there are several key
distinctions that make it difficult to claim that a right to same-sex marriage can be found in the
right to privacy. The fact that marriage is not as private as sexual conduct suggests that the
government does not have as great a duty to protect it as a part of liberty. The historical
precedent of not allowing same-sex marriage is different than the historical precedent used to
legalize homosexual sodomy. Therefore, neither Lawrence nor Griswold are the proper legal
precedent to establish a right to same-sex marriage. Instead, based on the evidence collected in
this thesis, the best legal precedent for a right to same-sex marriage lies in the Equal Protection
Clause.

Equal Protection Clause Rational Basis Test Analysis
The examination of the doctrinal development of the Equal Protection Clause and the
right to privacy in this thesis reveals that the right to same-sex marriage exists under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Political scholars have recognized that the
Equal Protection Clause provides the best legal groundwork for the creation of the right to samesex marriage (see Gerstmann, Hiller, Schaff, Schmidtke and Strasser). However, these scholars
disagree how the Supreme Court should address the government’s violation of Equal Protection
Clause through its denial of same-sex marriage.
As already stated in this thesis, sexual minorities are given the lowest level of protection
from government laws under the rational basis test. Some political and legal authors (see
Gerstmann and Schmidtke) argue that the Court never should have created differing tests for
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different minorities. Instead, they believe that sexual minorities and all other minority
classifications, including race and religion, should be given the same level of protection against
discriminatory laws. These authors argue that if sexual minorities received the same protection as
racial and religious minorities then the government would not be able to prove a compelling
reason for prohibiting same-sex marriage. Other authors (see Strasser, Schaff and Hiller) argue
that the classification system should remain intact but that laws discriminating against sexual
minorities should have to pass the strict scrutiny test instead of the rational basis test. According
to these authors, if the prohibition of same-sex marriage had to face the strict scrutiny test, the
government would not be able to provide a compelling interest to satisfy the test. Therefore, both
of these arguments generally focus on sexual minorities receiving a greater level of protection
against discrimination than they currently receive.
This thesis argues that even under the lowest level of scrutiny, the rational basis test, the
government does not have a legitimate reason for prohibiting same-sex marriage. The
government and opponents of same-sex marriage have often given specific reasons for why they
believe that same-sex marriage should not be legalized. These reasons include the argument that
the purpose of marriage is the procreation of children, the argument that children of gay parents
will experience gender confusion, the argument that the tradition of marriage must be preserved
and lastly the argument that same-sex parents are not as good at parenting as opposite-sex
parents. David Masci summarizes the government’s most common arguments for the prevention
of same-sex marriage when he writes:
Social conservatives and others who oppose same-sex unions assert that marriage
between a man and a woman is the bedrock of a healthy society because it leads to stable
families and, ultimately, to children who grow up to be productive adults. Allowing gay
and lesbian couples to wed, they argue, will radically redefine marriage and further
weaken it at a time when the institution is already in deep trouble due to high divorce
rates and the significant number of out-of-wedlock births. (Masci).
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However, after the analysis of these arguments is complete, it is clear that these interests in
preventing same-sex marriage are fundamentally flawed and do not pass the rational basis test.
The first argument that is sometimes made against allowing same-sex marriage is that
marriage is an institution meant for the procreation of children. The government and opponents
of same-sex marriage argue that because it is not possible for same-sex couples to biologically
produce children, they do not meet the most basic component of marriage. One group that makes
this argument is the American Family Association (AFA). According to its website, the
American Family Association is a nonprofit organization that promotes traditional family values
based on the Christian faith. The AFA strongly opposes same-sex marriage and explains that
procreation is a necessary possibility of all marriages. The AFA cites Hadley Arkes, Professor of
Jurisprudence and American Institutions at Amherst College, to explain that the biology of
creating a child is a necessity to marriage. According to the AFA, Arkes says, “It becomes
impossible finally to discuss this matter of marriage and sexuality without using the N-word:
nature. The question must return to that sexuality stamped in our natures…namely, the
inescapable fact that only two people, not three, only a man and a woman, can beget a child”
(Vitagliano).
An organization that agrees with the AFA is the National Organization for Marriage
(NOM) which is a nonprofit organization created to protect traditional marriage. Like the AFA,
the NOM makes the argument that because same-sex couples cannot reproduce through sexual
intercourse, they should not be allowed to marry. The NOM notes the necessity of having parents
from each gender for the well-being of the children of married couples. The NOM writes, “Every
man and woman who marries is capable of giving any child they create (or adopt) a mother and a
father. No same-sex couple can do this” (“Marriage Talking Points”). These two organizations
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believe that because same-sex couples cannot produce children in the way that nature intends,
they are not entitled to marriage from a biological and evolutionary standpoint.
It is true that same-sex couples are not biologically able to have children. However, it is
not logical to claim that because they cannot reproduce like opposite-sex couples, they are unfit
to marry. The main problem with the reproduction argument is that the government currently
allows opposite-sex couples to marry even though they are not capable of procreation. For
example, states do not have an age limit for marriage. Opposite-sex couples who are over sixty
are allowed to marry if they wish. However, women over sixty have gone through menopause
and are not biologically able to become pregnant. The lack of an age limit for marriage suggests
that the government is not concerned that opposite-sex couples enter marriages despite being
unable to reproduce. Due to this, it is illogical to suggest that same-sex couples should not be
able to marry because they will never reproduce children. In “A Right to Marry?” Martha
Nussbaum makes this point when she writes, “It is very difficult, in terms of the state’s interest
in procreation, to explain why the marriage of two heterosexual seventy-year-olds should be
permitted and the marriage of two men or two women should be forbidden—all the more
because so many same-sex couples have and raise children” (49). As Nussbaum notes there is a
clear disconnect between the argument that the government must prevent same-sex couples from
marrying because they cannot reproduce and the reality that older opposite-sex couples are
allowed to marry even though they cannot reproduce.
Not only are older opposite-sex couples allowed to marry despite their inability to
procreate, but many younger couples are allowed to marry even though biological conditions
make them unable to reproduce. Both men and women at all different ages suffer from infertility.
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention “about 10 percent of women in the
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United States ages 15-44 have difficulty getting pregnant or staying pregnant” (“Infertility Facts
Sheet”). Infertility in women is most often caused by problems with ovulation. Infertility also
occurs in men, most often due to problems with the number or movement of sperm (“Infertility
Facts Sheet”). These biological problems result in an inability to reproduce children without
medical help. Commonly, couples who are infertile seek to become pregnant through artificial
insemination in which the woman is injected with specially prepared sperm or through assisted
reproductive technology (“Infertility Facts Sheet”). Although it is very difficult for couples who
are infertile to reproduce, the government does not prohibit them from marrying.
The fact that the government allows infertile couples to marry, does not logically follow
its argument that the purpose of marriage is the creation of children. Also the denial of marriage
to same-sex couples because they cannot have children does not recognize the reality that many
same-sex couples do have children. In fact, same-sex couples often have children through the
same procedures that infertile couples use. Richard Mohr comments on this when he writes, “The
assumption that childrearing is a function uniquely tethered to the institution of heterosexual
marriage also collides with an important but little acknowledged social reality. Many lesbian and
gay couples already are raising families in which children are the blessings of adoption, artificial
insemination, surrogacy, or prior marriages” (224). The government allows infertile couples to
marry despite their inability to fulfill what the government claims is one of the most basic
components of marriage. It is illogical that the government wishes to prohibit sexual minorities
from marrying because they cannot reproduce but does not wish to apply this same standard to
opposite-sex couples who cannot reproduce.
The argument made by the government and opponents of same-sex marriage that gay and
lesbian couples cannot marry because they cannot reproduce holds no logical ground. The fact
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that opposite-sex couples can marry despite being too old to become pregnant or infertile shows
that the government is not being consistent in its argument. Instead, the government specifically
discriminates against sexual minorities. Therefore, the argument that the government has a
legitimate interest in keeping procreation in marriages does not pass the rational basis test.
Another argument that is sometimes used to justify the exclusion of same-sex marriage is
that it will result in an increase in gender and sexuality confusion in children. The argument is
that since children of same-sex parents lack the presence of either a man or a woman in their
household, they will be more likely to be confused about their own gender and sexual identity.
Stephanie Pappas writes in the Huffington Post that “On Jan. 6, Republican presidential hopeful
Rick Santorum told a New Hampshire audience that children are better off with a father in prison
than being raised in a home with lesbian parents and no father at all” (Pappas). Many opponents
of same-sex marriage agree with Rick Santorum’s argument that children that lack either a male
or female parent will be negatively affected by it. Therefore, a legitimate concern for the
government might be the identity development of children.
The argument that children of gay parents become confused about their gender and
sexual identities is widely refuted by scientific data. The American Academy of Pediatrics
(AAP) conducted a study of the development of children with same-sex parents. The study found
that “The gender identity of preadolescent children raised by lesbian mothers has been found
consistently to be in line with their biological gender. None of the 500 children studied have
shown evidence of gender-identity confusion, wished to be the other gender, or consistently
engaged in cross-gender behavior” (Pawelski 360). Sociologist Judith Stacey from New York
University and Associate Professor of Sociology Tim Biblarz from University of Southern
California found very similar results to the AAP in 2010 when they reviewed almost every study
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that had been conducted about same-sex parenting. Judith Stacey says, “There's no doubt
whatsoever from the research that children with two lesbian parents are growing up to be just as
well-adjusted and successful as children with a male and a female parent” (Pappas). Both the
American Academy of Pediatrics and Judith Stacey noted that there is almost no research that
exists that evaluates the parenting skills of gay men. However, Stacey speculates that gay men
are even better parents than lesbians because there is no possible way that they could
accidentally become pregnant even though they did not want to have the children. Instead, she
explains that if a male gay couple wants to have children the men must be very committed
because they must willingly seek adoption or a surrogate (Pappas). Therefore, it appears that
confusion about gender identity is not a true concern for gay parents.
Similarly to gender confusion, data also shows that children of same-sex parents are not
generally confused about their sexuality. In an article written for the AAP, J.G. Pawelski writes,
“The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry states ‘It has long been established
that a homosexual orientation is not related to psychopathology, and there is no basis on which to
assume that a parental homosexual orientation will increase likelihood of or induce a
homosexual orientation in the child’” (362). Therefore, sexual confusion or the changing of
sexual orientation is not generally found to be a problem for children with same-sex parents.
Also, they have not been found to be any more sexually active than children raised by oppositesex parents. The AAP writes that “using data from a national sample of adolescents, no
difference was found on the basis of whether the parents were the same or different genders in
the proportion of adolescents who reported having had sexual intercourse, nor was a difference
found in the number who reported having a ‘romantic relationship’ within the past 18 months”
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(Pawelski 360). Therefore, the claim that children of gay parents will be confused sexually is not
correct according to the leading organizations responsible for child development.
The government does have a legitimate interest in the healthy development of children.
However, scientific and sociological research shows that children of same-sex parents develop in
the same way that children of opposite-sex parents develop. Leading child development and
health organizations like the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American Academy of
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry claim that children of same-sex couples develop in a healthy
and normal way. Contrary to what opponents of same-sex marriage claim, children of same-sex
partners are not more likely to experience gender or sexual confusion. Therefore, the interest in
the healthy development of children is not an adequate reason for preventing same-sex marriage
and does not pass the rational basis test.
Another reason that is often given for the government’s prohibition of same-sex marriage
is that marriage is an institution with deep rooted history. It is argued that since the definition of
marriage has remained constant throughout most of history, the definition should not be altered
to include gay marriage. The American Family Association (AFA) believes that marriage is a
hallowed institution that should not be changed. The AFA writes, “Homosexual activists,
however, have hammered tirelessly against the doors of heterosexual marriage, demanding to be
allowed into the sacred halls beyond” (Vitagliano). Like the AFA, The Mormon Church has
declared that same-sex marriages "undermine the divinely created institution of family" (Ryan
25). Opponents of same-sex marriage also argue that if the definition of marriage were changed,
the institution of marriage would deteriorate. The National Organization for Marriage (NOM)
makes this argument when it writes that “high rates of divorce are one more reason we should be
strengthening marriage, not conducting radical social experiments on it” (“Marriage Talking
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Points”). The NOM argues that changing the definition of marriage would make it more
susceptible to higher rates of divorce and instability. Therefore, the government might have an
interest in promoting the stability of an institution deeply rooted in American history.
The idea that the definition of marriage has remained unchanged throughout American
history is flawed. Several aspects of traditional marriage have been abandoned as culture has
evolved. In “The Case for Gay Marriage” Richard Mohr explains that “there used to be major
gender-based legal differences in marriage, but these have all been found to be unjust and have
gradually been eliminated through either legislative or judicial means” (222). One gender-based
difference that has been rejected is the idea that wives are the property of their husbands and are
required to obediently serve them. In “Here’s Your Traditional Marriage” Patrick Ryan writes
that “traditional families hardly exist today in the United States or any other industrial
society…not because we've lost our moral bearings but because we have rejected the ethics of a
traditional master-servant world” (25). Historically, women held a legal status called “coverture”
in which a wife was legally and economically owned by her husband (Ryan 26). Additionally,
throughout a great deal of history, marriage was based on property laws. The ownership of
property determined if a man was desirable and when a marriage would occur (Ryan 26).
Therefore traditionally, marriage was not based on love or companionship, but rather on property
ownership.
The modern definition of marriage, has largely abandoned these traditions of property
rights and servitude. The creation of the modern definition of American marriage was largely a
result of industrial development in the 19th Century. Patrick Ryan writes:
As family law was transformed into modern terms throughout the 19th century, market
societies consolidated wealth through the rise of corporations, factories, and mills, and
this progressively put the small householder out of business…Women gained rights to
property; dowry and coverture were abandoned. No longer were all mothers, children,
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and laborers the property of a master. In line with the new economy, marriage emerged as
a contractual state between consenting adults. (26-27).
Ryan explains that today, the traditional roles of husband and wife have been replaced by a
modern reciprocal relationship. Therefore, the claim that marriage has held a consistent
definition throughout history is greatly refuted by the fact that marriage has evolved over time to
liberate wives and husbands from archaic cultural views. The changes in gender-based
differences in marriages show that marriage is not a static institution that cannot evolve to align
with the development of society.
Another example of how marriage has changed over time is that couples of different
races were once unable to marry. Prior to the Supreme Court case Loving v. Virginia (1967),
couples of different races were prohibited from marrying each other in several states. Opponents
of biracial marriage made very similar claims to those that are being made against same-sex
marriage today. They claimed that biracial couples would cause the disintegration of marriage
and would sully the tradition of marriage. In the oral arguments of the case, the attorney for the
state, R.D. Mcllwaine makes this argument when he says that “this statute serves a legitimate
legislative objective of preventing the sociological, psychological evils which attend interracial
marriages” (Loving v. Virginia “Oral Arguments”). Throughout the oral arguments he portrays
interracial marriages as an evil that would negatively impact the well-being of society. Similarly
to opponents of same-sex marriage today, opponents of interracial marriage claimed that science
suggested that interracial marriage would threaten the tradition of family. Mr. Mcllwaine claims
that the “problems which a child of interracial marriage faces are those which no child can come
through without damage to himself” (Loving v. Virginia “Oral Arguments”).
However, throughout the oral arguments of the case, Justice Hugo Black is not convinced
that there is any compelling interest. Instead, he believes that the sole purpose of the statute is to
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keep blacks inferior to whites. He asks Mr. Mcllwaine “aside from all questions from the
genetics, psychology, psychiatry, sociology…is there any doubt in your mind that the object of
this statute, the basic premise on which they rest, is that the white people are superiors of the
colored people and should not be permitted to marry?” (Loving v. Virginia “Oral Arguments”).
Mr. Mcllwaine admits that the intent of the legislature who enacted the statute might have been
the repression of blacks. Therefore, perhaps the legislature really did believe that it enacted this
statute for the preservation of marriage, however, that belief was based on racial prejudices
rather than truth and the law was found unconstitutional. This shows that the Supreme Court can
be responsible for changing the definition of marriage to produce greater equality and that the
government cannot regulate marriage unfairly. Also, it is important to note that when opponents
of same-sex marriage talk about the tradition of marriage, it is a tradition that only extends back
forty-five years because the definition of marriage was changed in 1967 to encompass a broader
range of freedom in choosing a marriage partner.
There is also a flaw in the claim that the tradition of marriage must be preserved because
it is a sacred union between one man and one woman. This claim is often based on the religious
coupling of Adam and Eve in the Bible. However, the Bible contains several references to the
acceptance of polygamy. Therefore, it is not correct that the tradition of marriage between one
man and one woman extends all the way back to biblical times. In “A Right to Marry?” Martha
Nussbaum explains that “people who base their ethical norms on the Bible too rarely take note of
the fact that the society depicted in the Old Testament is polygamous” (46). For example the
Bible states that “King Solomon had 700 wives and 300 concubines” (Holy Bible, 1 Kings.
11.3). The acceptance of polygamy is also mentioned in Exodus 21:10, 2 Samuel 5:13, and
Deuteronomy 21:15. Polygamy has never been allowed in the United States. Therefore, the
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current label of traditional marriage is in conflict with the tradition of marriage in the Bible. This
discrepancy between the religious tradition of marriage and the American tradition of marriage
shows that marriage has varied in its definition across time and place.
Lastly, the idea that same-sex marriage will result in the instability and deterioration of
marriage is based on an assumption that same-sex couples are less committed to each other than
heterosexual couples. This assumption is incorrect. Same-sex couples have not been found to be
any more likely to divorce than opposite-sex couples. John Gottman conducted a twelve year
study to determine the similarities and differences between heterosexual relationships and gay
and lesbian relationships. Gottman is a Ph.D. psychologist and is a leading researcher of
relationships in America. Gottman studied forty couples and used three methods including selfreports of participants, observed interactions of participants and the participant’s physiology
(Gottman 25). He researched whether same-sex couples were more likely to split up and whether
they were more likely to experience volatile relationships than heterosexual couples. Prior to
explaining the results for his own study, Gottman explains that “longitudinal research on gay,
lesbian and heterosexual married couples by Kurdek and his associates (e.g., Kurdek, 1998) has
generally concluded that gay and lesbian relationships operate on essentially the same principles
as heterosexual relationships” (24). Therefore, although research on homosexual relationships is
new to the field of relationship studies, Lawrence Kurdek found initial research that same-sex
couples did not significantly differ from opposite-sex couples.
Gottman’s own research supports Kurdek’s previous study. Gottman found that all
relationships function based on rewards and costs. He writes, “Our results were consistent with
Kurdek and Rusbult’s investment, or cost-benefit model, which suggested that relationship
satisfaction is associated with low costs and high rewards” (Gottman 40). Gottman explains that
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in his study relationships were more likely to continue if partners felt like they were getting a lot
of rewards from the relationship and less likely to continue if partners felt burdened by the
relationship. He found this to be true regardless of whether the couple was heterosexual or of the
same-sex. In essence, what mattered most in relationships was the cost-rewards ratio and samesex couples were not more likely to leave relationships than opposite-sex couples. Therefore, his
research does not support the idea that same-sex couples are more likely to split up than
opposite-sex couples.
A study which was conducted by another Ph.D. psychologist, Kimberly Balsam, supports
Gottman’s and Kurdek’s research. In her study, Balsam followed 65 male and 138 female samesex couples who had civil unions in Vermont, 23 male and 61 female same-sex couples who did
not have civil unions and 55 heterosexual couples (102). She collected self-reports from her
participants for three years. Balsam found that there were no differences between same-sex
couples in civil unions and heterosexual married couples. However, she did find that “same-sex
couples not in civil unions were more likely to have ended their relationships than same-sex
couples in civil unions or heterosexual married couples. This implies that civil unions may
indeed have an impact on relationships over time” (Balsam 112). The study suggests that legal
recognition of a marriage might increase the likelihood that couples remain together.
Interestingly, Balsam also found that same-sex couples reported superior satisfaction in their
relationships compared to heterosexual couples. She writes that compared to heterosexual
couples “…both types of same-sex couples reported greater relationship quality, compatibility,
and intimacy, and lower levels of conflict” (Balsam 102). Therefore, Balsam concludes that not
only are same-sex couples not more likely to divorce, but they might have more happy and stable
relationships than heterosexual couples. By claiming that same-sex marriage will result in greater
rates of divorce and the corrosion of marriage, opponents of same-sex marriage are judging

Cerreta 65
same-sex couples without knowing anything about their true character. Therefore, this argument
is made based on personal prejudices against homosexuals and lesbians rather than any evidence
of its validity.
Since the government oversees the contractual aspects of the institution of marriage, it is
logical to believe that it has an interest in its stability and tradition. However, marriage has
changed as culture and societies have changed. Marriage was once based on property rights and
women were reduced to being property of their husbands. This traditional definition of marriage
has long been abandoned. Marriage was once forbidden between people of different races. This
traditional definition of marriage has also been abandoned. The Bible historically depicts
polygamous marriages. Today, the definition of marriage is anything but traditional. Therefore,
the government does not have a legitimate interest in keeping same-sex couples from marrying
for the preservation of a tradition of marriage that does not exist.
Another argument against same-sex marriage is that same-sex couples are not as good of
parents as opposite-sex couples because they cannot provide their children with the balance of a
male and female parent. The claim is that same-sex parents cannot be good parents because
children’s development relies on the skills and roles that they learn from both a female and male
parent. One organization that makes this claim is the Catholic Education Resource Center which
is an online database of essays, journal articles, and other texts that convey Catholic teachings.
The Catholic Education Resource Center states that “according to science, there are hundreds of
nuances about men and women that even newborn infants can readily distinguish and that make
a difference in the way the child develops” (Brinkmann). The Catholic Education Resource
Center cites researcher Henry Biller to explain that mothers and fathers have different verbal
styles and different ways of showing love for a child (Brinkmann). Therefore, opponents of
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same-sex marriage believe that children who grow up in same-sex parent households are less
healthy psychologically and socially than children who grow up in opposite-sex parent
households. Some opponents of same-sex marriage also believe that gays and lesbians are less
likely to remain in committed relationships which results in a less stable environment for their
children. On its website the Catholic Education Resource Center explains a “concern for the
stability of the relationship” of gay and lesbian partners (Brinkmann). These arguments suggest
that the government has a legitimate interest in prohibiting same-sex marriage so that children
grow up with adequate parenting from both a female and a male parent.
The claim that gay parents are insufficient parents is not supported by several respected
psychological, pediatric and sociological organizations. Within the past couple of decades, samesex couples have increasingly had children through adoption, surrogate pregnancies and in vitro
fertilization procedures. Due to the increase in children with same-sex parents, a greater amount
of medical and psychological studies have been performed to determine if children really do
suffer from having same-sex parents. Overwhelmingly, the results of these studies have shown
that children of same-sex couples do not suffer a worse social, psychological or medical fate than
children of opposite-sex couples. Instead, the studies show that the most important factor for the
healthy development of a child is the love from two parents, regardless of the gender or sexual
identity of the parents.
The American Medical Association (AMA) is one organization that supports the
legalization of same-sex marriage because of the medical benefits that it would bestow upon
same-sex couples and their children. The AMA is an organization meant to unite physicians to
promote the betterment of public health (“About the AMA”). The AMA has adopted specific
policies concerning gay and lesbian medical issues. The AMA supports partner co-adoption by
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same-sex couples. According to its policy the AMA “will support legislative and other efforts to
allow the adoption of a child by the same-sex partner, or opposite sex non-married partner, who
functions as a second parent or co-parent to that child” (“AMA Policies on GLBT Issues”). In
addition to its support for adoption, the AMA wholeheartedly supports same-sex marriage. It
sees the denial of same-sex marriage as a medical burden on same-sex families. In its policy the
AMA writes:
Our American Medical Association: (1) recognizes that denying civil marriage based on
sexual orientation is discriminatory and imposes harmful stigma on gay and lesbian
individuals and couples and their families; (2) recognizes that exclusion from civil
marriage contributes to health care disparities affecting same-sex households; (3) will
work to reduce health care disparities among members of same-sex households including
minor children; and (4) will support measures providing same-sex households with the
same rights and privileges to health care, health insurance, and survivor benefits, as
afforded opposite-sex households. (“AMA Policies on GLBT Issues”).
The AMA believes that denying same-sex marriage causes an inequality in health care
procedures which negatively impacts not only same-sex couples, but their children as well.
Therefore, the American Medical Association does not agree with the argument that same-sex
parents have a negative impact on the health of their children.
Another medical organization that believes that children of same-sex couples are
negatively impacted by the denial of gay marriage is the American Academy of Pediatrics
(AAP). The AAP seeks to “attain optimal physical, mental, and social health and well-being for
all infants, children, adolescents and young adults” (“AAP Facts”). The AAP believes that
children deserve for their parents’ relationships to be legally recognized for their own emotional
and psychological well-being. According to J.G. Pawelski, who writes for the AAP, “children of
same-gender parents often experience economic, legal and familial insecurity as a result of the
absence of legal recognition of their bonds to their nonbiological parents” (352). Therefore, the
AAP believes that the lack of legal recognition given to same-sex parents actually has negative
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effects on their children. The AAP also addresses the argument that children of same-sex parents
are socially awkward. The APP does not see evidence that supports this argument. Instead, it has
found that “in general, children whose parents are gay or lesbian have been found to have normal
relationships with childhood peers and to maintain social relationships appropriate for their
developmental levels” (Pawelski 359). In fact, the AAP has found that children of same-sex
partners are sometimes more likely to interact in positive ways with other children. For example,
children of same-sex couples have been found to be more accepting of children who are different
than themselves (Pawelski 359). The AAP has also found that children with gay or lesbian
parents are more nurturing to children younger than themselves (Pawelski 35). Therefore, the
American Academy of Pediatrics argues that the denial of same-sex marriage places an
unnecessary strain on the children of same-sex couples.
Like the AAP, the American Psychological Association (APA) supports the legalization
of same-sex marriage. In fact, in 2011, the APA’s policymaking board supported same-sex
marriage by a vote of 157-0 (Gilbert). The APA notes research that shows that there is very little
difference between same-sex parents and opposite-sex parents. For example, the APA cites
Letitia Anne Peplau, PhD, UCLA, who administered surveys and found that “75 percent of
lesbians and more than half of gay men were in a relationship with one person” (Munsey
“Psychology’s Case”). She also found that “many lesbians and gay men date in their 20s, settle
down into a relationship in their 30s and maintain it long-term” (Munsey “Psychology’s Case”).
Therefore, the APA does not conclude that children of same-sex parents experience greater
instability than children of heterosexual parents.
In addition to the AMA, APA and AAP there are other medical and sociological
organizations that do not believe that the legalization of same-sex marriage would have a
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negative impact on the development of children. The American Academy of Family Physicians
(AAFP) is a medical organization and its mission is to “to preserve and promote the science and
art of Family Medicine and to ensure high-quality, cost-effective health care for patients of all
ages” (“AAFP About Us”). Like the American Academy of Pediatrics, the AAFP believes that
same-sex couples should be guaranteed the same legal rights as heterosexual married couples.
The AAFP has established that it wants to secure the psychological and legal security of all
children regardless of their parents’ sexual orientation (Pawleski 362). The American
Psychoanalytical Association’s position on this issue states that “gay and lesbian individuals and
couples are capable of meeting the best interest of the child and should be afforded the same
rights and should accept the same responsibilities as heterosexual parents’” (Pawleski 362).
Lastly, the National Association of Social Workers believes that same-sex couples should have
the same rights to adoption, inheritance and child custody as heterosexual couples (Pawleski
362). The numerous organizations that believe that the legalization of same-sex marriage would
be beneficial for children reveals that gay and lesbian parents are not worse parents than
heterosexual parents.
The overwhelming support from many medical and psychological organizations for the
legalization same-sex marriage calls into question the argument that gay parents are bad parents.
These organizations are entrusted with the promotion of the health and well-being of children
throughout America and they believe that the denial of same-sex marriage is actually hurting
children. In fact, many of these organizations believe that having same-sex parents can be
beneficial for the character development of young children. It has also been found that same-sex
partners are not more likely to break up than heterosexual couples. Therefore, the argument that
children of same-sex parents are more likely to experience an unstable family life is not correct.
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The government does have a duty to protect the health and development of children. However, a
vast array of medical and psychological organizations believe that children of same-sex couples
develop into just as healthy adults as children of heterosexual couples. Therefore, the
government does not have a legitimate interest in preventing same-sex marriage to protect the
well-being of children.

Rational Basis Test Analysis Conclusion
Overall, the interests that have most commonly been used to justify the government’s
prohibition of same-sex marriage are not truly legitimate interests because they are not supported
by fact or reality. The argument that the government has a legitimate interest in promoting
procreation through marriage is contradicted by the fact that there is no age limit to marriage and
infertile couples are allowed to marry. The idea that the government has a legitimate interest to
prevent gender and sexual confusion in children is refuted by the research of the American
Academy of Pediatrics and the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry. The
argument that the government has an interest in the preservation of traditional marriage is
challenged by the fact that the definition of marriage has changed throughout much of history.
Lastly, the argument that the government has a legitimate interest in prohibiting same-sex
marriage for the well-being of children is contested by numerous medical and psychological
organizations whose sole purpose is the betterment of the health and well-being of children. The
inability of the government to present one true legitimate interest in denying same-sex marriage
proves that the government cannot pass the rational basis test and therefore, is violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
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Courts v. Legislatures: Determining the Right
The results of the previous sections of this thesis reveal that there is a constitutional right
to same-sex marriage. Although the right exists under the United States Constitution, many state
governments and the Federal Government have been slow to recognize the right. The Federal
Government’s reluctance to recognize same-sex marriage is demonstrated by the Congress’s
passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996, which defines marriage as being
between one man and one woman, and also permits states to refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages performed in other states (U.S. Congress “DOMA”). Following the enactment of
DOMA, an overwhelming majority of state legislatures passed bills that adopted DOMA at the
state level (Rosenberg Hollow Hope 368). These actions by state governments and the United
States Government have led certain political science and law scholars to believe that it is the
responsibility of the courts in this country to recognize the right to same-sex marriage (see
Dworkin, Hiller, Schmidtke and Nussbaum). In particular, Ronald Dworkin argues that because
legislatures rely on the political agenda of the majority, they are less likely to be willing to
recognize the rights of minority groups. The following sections of this thesis use case studies of
three states which have legalized same-sex marriage to prove that Dworkin’s theory is validated
by the legalization of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, New York and California.
In Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin argues that it is the responsibility of the
courts to recognize the rights of minority citizens and to shield them from the prejudices of the
political and social majority. He explains that members of legislatures rely on the will of the
majority of citizens in their districts to become reelected. Due to the personal motivation to
become reelected, legislators are more likely to follow the will of the majority than to recognize
the rights of those in the minority (Dworkin 133). He notes that historically, the majority of
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citizens have been slow or unwilling to extend basic rights to citizens who constitute minority
groups when he writes, “It has been typical of these disputes that the interests of those in political
control of the various institutions of the government have been both homogeneous and hostile”
(Dworkin 143). This means that if legislators are motivated by the desires of the majority, they
are less likely to pass legislation that goes against those desires. In contrast, Supreme Court
Justices are not elected by the people and do not face reelection (Rosenberg Hollow Hope 22).
Even Gerald Rosenberg, who believes that the courts are rarely able to produce social change,
contends in The Hollow Hope that “Elected and appointed officials, fearful of political
repercussions, are seldom willing to fight for unpopular causes and protect the rights of disliked
minorities. Courts, free of such electoral accountability, are not so constrained” (22). Due to this
separation of the courts from the will of the majority, Dworkin believes that they are in a better
position to recognize minority rights (133).
Not only does Dworkin believe that the courts are the most appropriate branch of
government to determine minority rights, but he also believes that it is their duty. He sees the
courts as having their own responsibilities separate from the legislatures. He does not agree with
the notion that the courts are merely responsible for reviewing laws passed by the legislatures.
He writes that “…judges neither should be nor are deputy legislators, and the familiar
assumption, that when they go beyond political decisions already made by someone else they are
legislating, is misleading” (Dworkin 82). He explains that they can go beyond political decisions
that have already been made by legislatures because it is their responsibility to interpret vague
parts of the Constitution. Dworkin argues that the Founding Fathers left sections of the
Constitution vague so that the courts could handle situations that they could not foresee (136).
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Thus, Dworkin believes that the courts have a duty to determine controversial cases involving
minority rights.
Since Ronald Dworkin wrote Taking Rights Seriously in 1977, he never applied his
theory to the issue of same-sex marriage. His theory suggests that for same-sex marriage, the
courts should be more likely to recognize the right when public support for it is low. On the other
hand, legislatures should be less likely to legalize same-sex marriage until a majority of citizens
support it. By analyzing public opinion polls from the Gallup Organization, Quinnipiac
University, CBS and the Associated Press, Dworkin’s theory will be tested to see if the process
of legalization of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, New York and California support his
theory. Each poll asks whether citizens would favor a constitutional amendment banning samesex marriage. High levels of support for a constitutional amendment would suggest that the
courts are more likely to legalize same-sex marriage than the legislatures. Less than fifty percent
support for the amendment would suggest that the legislatures might be more likely to recognize
a right to same-sex marriage.
Massachusetts’s Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage in 2003 (“Same-Sex
Marriage”). According to Dworkin’s theory, public support for a constitutional amendment
banning same-sex marriage in 2003 should have been higher than fifty percent, which led the
courts to intervene in the issue. California’s State Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage in
May 2008 but was then challenged by a constitutional amendment that was passed that banned
same-sex marriage in later 2008 (“Same-Sex Marriage”). Based on Dworkin’s theory, support
for a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage should have been high in 2008 which
resulted in the courts taking action. Also, the passage of the constitutional amendment in
California suggests that public support for the constitutional amendment should have been high.
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Lastly, the New York Legislature passed a bill legalizing same-sex marriage in 2011 (“Same-Sex
Marriage”). Dworkin’s theory suggests that support for a constitutional amendment banning
same-sex marriage should have decreased to lower than fifty percent, persuading the legislature
to recognize the minority right. Examining public opposition to same-sex marriage at the times it
was legalized in these states will reveal that Dworkin’s theory is applicable to the legalization of
same-sex in these three states.
As previously mentioned in the methods section of this thesis, there are important
procedures that need to be followed to get a valid public opinion poll. The type of the poll that is
used is an indicator of whether the poll’s findings truly represent the opinions of the general
public. Telephone interviews are widely used because the respondents are generally an accurate
representation of the whole population (Asher 66). Polls in which respondents self-select
themselves are to be viewed with caution because people who purposely decide to answer a poll
might have stronger feelings about its subject matter than the general population (Asher 14).
When comparing polls overtime, the wording of the polls should be as similar as possible so that
respondents are answering the same question throughout different periods of time (Asher 43).
Changing the wording of a poll can cause respondents to believe they are being asked a different
question than originally intended by the maker of the poll (Asher 44). To avoid collecting
nonattitudes, polls should also contain a middle choice that respondents can select if they do not
have an opinion or do not understand the question (Asher 26). Polls that are conducted by news
organizations are generally the most accepted because news organizations are not supposed to
have a political agenda that influences poll respondents (Asher 5).
The polls used in this thesis avoid nonattitudes by providing middle choices. They were
conducted by news organizations and polling organizations so that there should be little presence
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of political bias in the questions. All of the polls were conducted through telephone interviews
and have a respondent sample size of around 1,000, which is believed to be the correct sample
size to get the most accurate reflection of the general population (Asher 15). Therefore, the polls
used in this thesis avoid the pitfalls of bad polling. The polls give insight into public opinion
against same-sex marriage and reveal whether Dworkin’s theory is an accurate theory concerning
the right to same-sex marriage in the United States.
An explanation of the history of same-sex marriage in the United States is necessary to
understand the context of its legalization, or temporary legalization, in Massachusetts, New York
and California. There are two different paths that states have taken to legalize same-sex
marriage. Some states have legalized the right through State Supreme Court rulings. Other states
have legalized same-sex marriage through legislation passed by state legislatures. Hawaii was
the first state to legalize same-sex marriage and it did so through the courts. In Baehr v. Lewin
(1993) the Hawaiian Supreme Court ruled that the state’s denial of same-sex marriage violated
the equal protection clause of the Hawaiian Constitution because it denied rights based on sex (at
67). The Hawaiian Supreme Court then directed the trial court to review the case to determine if
the state government could give a compelling interest for prohibiting same-sex marriage (Baehr
v. Lewin 1993, at 68). In Baehr v. Miike (1996), the trial court concluded that the state had not
provided a compelling interest and that the state could not prohibit same-sex marriages (at 116).
However, the Hawaiian public was unwilling to accept the decision. After this decision, the
Hawaiian voters passed an amendment to the Hawaii Constitution which reserved power for the
Hawaii Legislature to pass legislation banning same-sex marriage (Tanner). The Hawaii
Legislature then passed a law banning same-sex marriage (Tanner). Today, Hawaii allows civil
unions but not same-sex marriage.
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The next state to attempt to legalize same-sex marriage was Vermont. The Vermont
Supreme Court ruled in Baker v. Vermont (1999) that Vermont’s prohibition of same-sex
marriage violated the state’s constitution because same-sex couples were being denied benefits
that opposite-sex couples received (at 868). However, the ruling did not result in the legalization
of same-sex marriage, but instead the legalization of civil unions (Baker v. Vermont 1999, at
886). Following Vermont’s attempt to legalize, Massachusetts was the first state to fully legalize
same-sex marriage through the Massachusetts Supreme Court case Goodridge v. Department of
Health (2003). Although attempts were made to amend the Massachusetts’s Constitution to
define marriage as between a man and a woman, the attempts failed and same-sex marriage
remains legal in Massachusetts today.
California was the next state to legalize same-sex marriage through the courts. In In re
Marriage Cases (2008), the California Supreme Court ruled that the state’s prohibition of samesex marriage violated equal protection guaranteed by the California Constitution (at 757).
However, in later 2008, voters passed Proposition 8, an amendment to the California
Constitution defining marriage between a man and a woman (Cal. Const. art. 1). In response,
U.S. District Judge Vaughn Walker ruled that Proposition 8 violates the United States
Constitution in the case Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010) (at 136). In February 2012 a panel of
the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Proposition 8 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution (Perry v. Brown 2012, at 1644). It is expected that Perry will be
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Today, however, same-sex marriage remains
prohibited in California.
Connecticut’s Supreme Court swiftly followed California and also legalized same-sex
marriage in 2008. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled in Kerrigan v. State Commissioner of
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Public Health (2008) that the state’s prohibition of same-sex marriage violated the Connecticut
Constitution (at 67). Then, in April, in the case Varnum v. Brien (2009), the Iowa Supreme Court
struck down the Iowa state law prohibiting same-sex marriage as unconstitutional (at 904). In
total, there have been six states whose courts have ruled that prohibiting same-sex marriage
violates their constitutions. However, only three of those states have fully legalized same-sex
marriage. Massachusetts, Connecticut and Iowa were all able to overcome backlash from their
legislatures and implement their Supreme Court rulings that legalized same-sex marriage.
The second path that states have used to legalize same-sex marriage is through their state
legislatures. Vermont fell just short of legalizing same-sex marriage in 1999 when it
implemented civil unions. Ten years later in 2009, the Vermont Legislature passed legislation
legalizing same-sex marriage and overrode the governor’s veto of the legislation (Richburg). In
May of 2009, Maine’s Legislature passed a bill legalizing same-sex marriage and the governor
signed it into law (Sacchetti). However, voters in Maine overturned the legislation and same-sex
marriage is not recognized in Maine today (Sacchetti). In June 2009, the New Hampshire
Legislature passed a bill legalizing same-sex marriage (Moskowitz).
In 2010, the Washington D.C. Council legalized same-sex marriage (Gorman). Then in
2011, the New York Legislature passed a bill legalizing same-sex marriage (Barbaro).
Additionally, on February 13, 2012, the Washington State Legislature adopted legislation
legalizing same-sex marriage (Murphy). Most recently, the Maryland Legislature passed a bill
legalizing same-sex marriage on March 1, 2012 (Breitenbach). In total, six states and
Washington D.C. have passed legislation legalizing same-sex marriage. However, Maine’s
Legislature experienced backlash from its residents and therefore, today only five states and
Washington D.C. have fully legalized same-sex marriage through legislative action.
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At the date of this thesis, same-sex marriage is legal in eight states and Washington D.C.
This brief history of the legalization of same-sex marriage reveals that both the courts and
legislatures at the state level have made various attempts to define the right to same-sex
marriage. While the question still remains as to which branch of government should be
responsible for the development of this right, the analyses of the legalization of same-sex
marriage in Massachusetts, New York, and California as seen in the following sections provide
the answer. For a summary of the states that have legalized same-sex marriage, refer to the table
below.

Table 1: States That Have Legalized Same-Sex Marriage
State

Year of Legalization

Method

Massachusetts

2003

Court

Connecticut

2008

Court

Iowa

2009

Court

Vermont

2009

Legislature

New Hampshire

2009

Legislature

Washington D.C.

2010

D.C. Council

New York

2011

Legislature

Washington

2012

Legislature

Maryland

2012

Legislature

Case Study of Massachusetts
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Massachusetts was the first state to legally and successfully start issuing marriage
licenses to same-sex couples after the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision Goodridge v.
Department of Health (2003). If Ronald Dworkin’s theory is valid, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court recognized the minority right because the social and political majorities in the state were
not willing to recognize it themselves. In the written decision for Goodridge Justice C. J.
Marshall confirms the logic behind Dworkin’s theory when he explains that the courts have the
distinct job of determining issues of a constitutional nature and are responsible for being the
great equalizer among citizens (Goodridge v. Department of Health 2003, at 312). He writes
that:
The Massachusetts Constitution requires that legislation meet certain criteria and not
extend beyond certain limits. It is the function of courts to determine whether these
criteria are met and whether these limits are exceeded. In most instances, these limits are
defined by whether a rational basis exists to conclude that legislation will bring about a
rational result…To label the court's role as usurping that of the Legislature, see, e.g., post
at 394-395 (Cordy, J., dissenting), is to misunderstand the nature and purpose of judicial
review. We owe great deference to the Legislature to decide social and policy issues, but
it is the traditional and settled role of courts to decide constitutional issues. (Goodridge v.
Department of Health 2003, at 338-339).
This shows that a majority of the justices on the Massachusetts Supreme Court believed that it
was their duty to fully defend the rights of minority groups guaranteed by the Massachusetts
Constitution.
In order to determine if the court was really acting in spite of a lack of support from the
majority, public opinion polls must be analyzed. Public opinion polls that sampled only the
opinions of the citizens of Massachusetts in 2003 are rare and the ones that exist lack an
adequate sample size. Therefore, the public opinion polls that are used in this thesis have
samples taken from the American adult population who own telephones. Since the Goodridge
decision was made in 2003, the public opinion polls that are used were conducted in 2003, but
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prior to the Goodridge decision. The Associated Press poll from 2003 collected responses from
1,028 telephone interviews and asked “Would you favor or oppose a law that would ban gay
marriage, requiring that marriage should be between a man and a woman?” (Associated Press
Poll 2003). Of the people interviewed, 52% said that they would favor a ban on same-sex
marriage, 41% said they would oppose a ban and 7% said they did not know or refused to answer
the question (Associated Press Poll 2003). Table 2 displays a graph of the results of the poll.

Table 2: Associated Press Poll, Aug, 2003
Would you favor or oppose a law that would ban gay marriage, requiring that marriage should be
between a man and a woman?

52% Favor
41% Oppose
7% Don’t know/Refused
Associated Press Poll, August 2003. Retrieved Nov-27-2011 from the iPOLL Databank, The
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

Therefore, this poll suggests that a majority of Americans supported a ban on same-sex marriage
rather than its legalization.
A second poll was conducted by the news organizations CNN and USA Today in
cooperation with the polling organization Gallup. Similarly to the Associated Press poll, this poll
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used 1,003 telephone interviews. The poll asked respondents “Would you favor or oppose a
constitutional amendment that would define marriage as being between a man and a woman, thus
barring marriages between gay or lesbian couples?” (CNN/Gallup/USA Today Poll 2003). Of the
people interviewed, 50% said they would favor barring marriages between same-sex couples,
45% said they would oppose an amendment banning it and 5% said they had no opinion on the
issue (CNN/Gallup/USA Today Poll 2003). Table 3 shows a graph of the results of the poll.

Table 3: CNN/Gallup/USA Today Poll, July, 2003
Would you favor or oppose a constitutional amendment that would define marriage as being
between a man and a woman, thus barring marriages between gay or lesbian couples?

50% Favor
45% Oppose
5% No Opinion
CNN/Gallup/USA Today Poll, July 2003. Retrieved Nov 27, 2011 from the iPOLL Databank,
The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

Although not quite as high as the Associated Press poll, the CNN/Gallup/USA Today poll also
reveals that a majority of citizens at the time favored banning same-sex marriage rather than
legalizing it.
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The process of the legalization of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts appears to support
Dworkin’s theory. According to the polling data, the social majority did not believe that samesex marriage should be a recognized right. Instead, they believed that legislation should be
passed to prohibit same-sex marriage. Since the Massachusetts Legislature and the majority of
American citizens did not support same-sex marriage, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
legalized it because of its duty to recognize constitutional rights and to protect the rights of
minority groups. However, not every member of the Massachusetts Supreme Court believed that
the courts have an obligation to determine the issue of same-sex marriage. In his dissenting
opinion in Goodridge, Justice Cordy states that he believes that the Massachusetts Legislature
should be given control over determining if same-sex marriage should be legalized. He writes,
“There is no reason to believe that legislative processes are inadequate to effectuate legal
changes in response to evolving evidence, social values, and views of fairness on the subject of
same-sex relationships” (Goodridge v Department of Health 2003, at 393-394). In the dissent,
Justice Cordy explains that the courts should accept that the legislatures might consider reasons
for prohibiting same-sex marriage that the courts are unable to fully understand (385). Therefore,
he believes that the issue of same-sex marriage should be left to legislatures, rather than the
courts, to decide.
However, Justice Cordy’s reasoning seems out of line with the doctrine of judicial
review, which allows for the courts to determine if laws passed by the legislature are
unconstitutional. The courts are designed to recognize legislation that discriminates against the
rights of minorities. Justice Cordy’s argument broadly asserts that courts should be excessively
lenient in evaluating if legislatures have a legitimate interest in creating a law that specifically
affects minority groups. This broad claim does not follow years of Supreme Court opinions in
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which minority groups receive fairly high levels of protection from government legislation. The
majority of the justices on the Massachusetts Supreme Court believed that the Massachusetts
Legislature lacked an adequate reason for prohibiting same-sex marriage. Therefore, although
Justice Cordy might believe that legislatures should be given the responsibility of recognizing a
minority right at their own pace, he was outnumbered by his fellow justices and Supreme Court
precedent.
In addition to the polling data, actions which were taken by the people of Massachusetts
and the Massachusetts legislature further support Dworkin’s theory that the legislatures are
influenced by the will of the majority. The Goodridge decision referenced the inequality that
results from heterosexual couples receiving benefits from marriage that same-sex couples are
denied (at 323). Due to this, the Massachusetts Senate attempted to rectify the inequality by
asking the Massachusetts Supreme Court if it could implement civil unions in the same way that
Vermont had (Peter 5A). This was an attempt by the legislature to avoid having to fully legalize
same-sex marriage. The Massachusetts Supreme Court responded that civil unions were not an
adequate remedy and that the legislature had to change the law to legalize same-sex marriage
(Peter 5A). Following this, opponents of same-sex marriage inside and outside of the
Massachusetts Legislature made several attempts to pass an amendment to the Massachusetts
Constitution defining marriage as being between one man and one woman. The legislature
originally tried to pass a constitutional amendment barring same-sex marriage but was not able to
overcome the requirement of approval from two successive sessions of the legislature sitting
together in a Constitutional Convention (“Massachusetts Lawmakers Recess”). Then hundreds of
thousands of signatures were collected by Massachusetts residents to have an amendment placed
on the ballot in 2008 (McDonald). However, this amendment was once again defeated in a
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Constitutional Convention (McDonald). It seems that in this particular case, not enough of the
legislature was willing to fight against the court’s decision to alter the Massachusetts
Constitution. However, it is still noteworthy that the attempts were made and were in-line with
public support for an amendment banning same-sex marriage.
Today, same-sex marriage in Massachusetts remains fairly secure. No recent attempts
have been made to alter the Massachusetts Constitution to define marriage as between only a
man and a woman. Although the public opinion polling data and the actions taken by the people
of Massachusetts suggest that Dworkin’s theory is correct, it must be taken with a grain of salt.
First, the polls interviewed citizens from all across America, reflecting a wide range of political
and moral opinions of the American people. There was a poll conducted by the Boston Globe
and WBZ-TV, following Goodridge which was only administered to Massachusetts residents
(Phillips; see also Rosenberg 350). When asked “Would you support or oppose an amendment to
the state constitution that would establish marriage solely as the union of a man and a woman,
effectively banning gay marriage?” only 36% said they would support an amendment while53%
said they would oppose an amendment (Phillips; see also Rosenberg 350). Table 4 shows a graph
of the results of the poll.

Table 4: Boston Globe and WBZ-TV Poll, 2003
Would you support or oppose an amendment to the state constitution that would establish
marriage solely as the union of a man and a woman, effectively banning gay marriage?
Answer

%
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Support

36

Oppose

53

Don’t Know/ Refused 11

Phillips, Frank, and Rick Klein. "50% in Poll Back SJC Ruling on Gay Marriage." The Boston
Globe 23 Nov. 2003. Boston.Com News, 23 Nov. 2003. Web. 24 Mar. 2012.
< http://www.boston.com/news/daily/23/gay_marriage_poll.htm/>.

This data shows that residents of Massachusetts might have viewed same-sex marriage more
favorably in 2003 than other more conservative areas of the country. However, the poll taken by
the Boston Globe and WBZ-TV only had 400 respondents (Phillips; see also Rosenberg 350).
The problem is that the most commonly used and accepted sample size for polls is 1,000
respondents. Therefore, this poll must be viewed critically since its sample size is less than half
the normal poll size. The small sample size of this poll makes it difficult to know if the social
majority in Massachusetts truly was supportive of same-sex marriage. All that can definitely be
concluded is that Dworkin’s theory appears to be correct that the Massachusetts Supreme Court
recognized a minority right when the majority of American citizens were unwilling to do so.
There might also be certain other factors that contribute to how a state legalizes same-sex
marriage. Rosenberg explains that there are certain factors that help the courts take on
controversial constitutional issues and implement change. He writes that “when political, social,
and economic conditions have become supportive of change, courts can effectively produce
significant social reform” (Rosenberg Hollow Hope 31). Rosenberg concludes that because
Massachusetts is one of the most liberal states in the country, it is likely that same-sex marriage
received support from the political elite and the public in Massachusetts (Hollow Hope 350). He
argues that most of the elite politicians in the state supported same-sex marriage with the
exception of Governor Mitt Romney (Rosenberg Hollow Hope 350). Due to this support, he
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believes that the Massachusetts Supreme Court was able to legalize same-sex marriage without
resulting in legislative backlash overriding its decision. Without these outside factors, Rosenberg
concludes that the courts are virtually powerless to make constitutional decisions and implement
them.
Although Rosenberg makes some logical points, the process of legalization in
Massachusetts does not necessarily support his conclusion. Rosenberg points to the public
opinion poll taken by the Boston Globe as evidence that a majority of residents in Massachusetts
supported the decision. However, the validity of this poll has already been seriously questioned
due to its small sample size. As a result, it is not possible to say that residents of Massachusetts
were more accepting of same-sex marriage in 2003 than the rest of the country. Additionally,
although Massachusetts is a very liberal state, there were a considerable number of legislators
who were seeking a constitutional amendment defining marriage between a man and a woman.
Rosenberg himself explains that in 2004, the first Constitutional Convention passed the
amendment by a vote of 105-92 (Hollow Hope 348). However the second Constitutional
Convention voted against the amendment because during the 2004 Massachusetts elections,
legislators who had supported the amendment were replaced by legislators who did not (Hollow
Hope 349). As previously mentioned, the second attempt to alter the Massachusetts Constitution
also passed the first Constitutional Convention but failed the second (McDonald). Also,
Governor Mitt Romney expressed his own disapproval of same-sex marriage. The fact that the
legislature made attempts to overturn the Goodridge decision with the support of the governor
suggests that there were a good number of political elites who did not support the legalization of
same-sex marriage. The unreliable polling data specifically from Massachusetts and the attempts
by the public and legislators to amend the Massachusetts Constitution reveal that the
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Massachusetts Supreme Court was most likely not greatly helped by the factors that Rosenberg
points to for the Goodridge decision’s success.

Case Study of New York
While Massachusetts is a clear example of a state taking a judicial path to legalize samesex marriage, New York is a clear example of a state taking a legislative path. The New York
Legislature passed a bill legalizing same-sex marriage on June 24th, 2011 and Governor Andrew
Cuomo gave his approval by signing the bill that same day (Wockner 6). Prior to its legalization
in 2011, the lower house of New York’s government had passed legislation legalizing same-sex
marriage in 2007 and 2009 (Dye). However, the bills from 2007 and 2009 died in the New York
Senate (Dye). The 2011 bill passed the New York Senate by a vote of 33-29 receiving the needed
bipartisan support to become law (Wockner 6).
The divide between supporters and opponents of the bill was along party lines. All but
one Democrat in the Senate voted for the legislation, while all but four Republicans voted against
it (Wockner 6). In order to gain the support of Republicans, Democrats in the New York Senate
offered a concession to conservatives. According to Reuters news journalist Jessica Dye,
“legislators agreed on language allowing religious organizations to refuse to perform services or
lend space for same-sex weddings” (Dye). This concession helped to motivate the four
Republicans to break ranks with their party and vote for legalization. One Republican Senator
who voted for legalization, Mark J. Grisanti, had run for office opposing same-sex marriage
(Barbaro). He explained why he changed his mind in a statement saying, “‘I apologize for those
who feel offended. I cannot deny a person, a human being, a taxpayer, a worker, the people of
my district and across this state, the State of New York, and those people who make it the great
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state that it is the same rights that I have with my wife’” (Barbaro). The actions of Senator
Grisanti and the other Republican Senators who voted for legalization are particularly interesting
because their votes against Republican Party wishes could cost them reelection. Also noteworthy
is the fact that the New York Senate was controlled by Republicans by a small margin (Barbaro).
Therefore, New York shows that in certain circumstances, members of legislatures can be
motivated to vote by factors other than their political party.
The actions of the New York Legislature represent the growing number of states which
have legalized same-sex marriage outside of the courts. According to Ronald Dworkin’s theory,
courts need to take action to protect minority rights when political and social majorities are
unwilling to recognize those rights. However, when support for a minority right reaches a fifty
percent majority, the legislatures are more likely to start recognizing the right. Therefore, if
Dworkin’s theory is correct, states that take the legislative path to legalize same-sex marriage did
so because a majority of citizens support same-sex marriage. Analysis of public opinion polls in
2011 will reveal whether the New York Legislature’s legalization of same-sex marriage supports
Dworkin’s theory.
In 2011 the Associated Press conducted a public opinion poll by interviewing 1,000
American citizens by telephone. One of the questions that the poll asked respondents was
“Would you favor, oppose or neither favor nor oppose a constitutional amendment defining
marriage as between a man and a woman?” (Associated Press/National Constitution Center/GfK
Poll 2011). The results of the poll showed that 48% of respondents favored a constitutional
amendment banning same-sex marriage while 43% opposed such an amendment (Associated
Press/National Constitution Center/GfK Poll 2011). Table 5 shows a graph of the results of the
poll.

Cerreta 89

Table 5: Associated Press/National Constitution Center/GfK Poll, Aug, 2011
Would you favor, oppose or neither favor nor oppose a constitutional amendment defining
marriage as between a man and a woman?

40% Strongly Favor
8% Somewhat Favor
8% Neither Favor Nor Oppose
11% Somewhat oppose
32% Strongly oppose
1% Don't know
1% Refused
Associated Press/National Constitution Center/GfK Poll, August 2011. Retrieved Mar-25-2012
from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of
Connecticut. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

Compared to the Associated Press poll in 2003, opposition to same-sex marriage in 2011 had
declined by 2%. In 2011, less than a majority of Americans supported an amendment barring
same-sex marriage. This poll reveals that opposition to same-sex marriage has decreased,
although not by a wide margin. Since less than a majority of Americans polled in 2011 supported
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an amendment defining marriage between a man and a woman, Dworkin’s theory is supported
by New York’s legalization of same-sex marriage.
Since New York legalized same-sex marriage recently, it was easier to obtain public
opinion polls that specifically surveyed residents of the state than it was to obtain similar polls
for Massachusetts. In June 2011, Quinnipiac University polled 1,317 New York registered voters
through telephone interviews (Quinnipiac Poll 2011). The polls asked “Would you support or
oppose a law that would allow same-sex couples to get married?” (Quinnipiac Poll 2011). The
poll also provided a middle “don’t know” choice for respondents. The results of the poll revealed
that 54% of New Yorkers supported the legalization of same-sex marriage while 40% opposed it
(Quinnipiac Poll 2011). Table 6 shows the results of the poll and is broken down by political
party affiliation, gender and race.

Table 6: Quinnipiac Poll, June, 2011
Would you support or oppose a law that would allow same-sex couples to get married?
Answer

Total Republican Democrat Independent Men
%

Women White

Black

Support

54

30

67

56

53

55

55

42

Oppose

40

63

28

39

42

39

40

50

Don’t
Know

5

7

4

4

5

6

5

9

Quinnipiac Poll, June 2011. Retrieved March 26 2011 from Quinnipiac University.
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/institutes-and-centers/polling-institute/new-york-state/release
detail?ReleaseID=1618
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The poll also revealed that there was a divide along party lines with 67% of Democrats
supporting same-sex marriage and 63% of Republicans opposing it (Quinnipiac Poll 2011). This
poll was conducted about a month prior to the New York Legislature’s legalization of same-sex
marriage. Unlike the poll taken of only Massachusetts residents in 2003, this poll has an
adequate sample size of residents of New York. Therefore, this poll does not need to be viewed
with the same degree of caution as the Massachusetts poll. The responses to this poll show that
much more than a majority of New Yorkers supported same-sex marriage at the time it was
legalized in the state. The poll provides ample evidence that supports Dworkin’s theory. Since
the majority of New Yorkers supported legalization, the courts were not needed to take action to
protect the rights of sexual minorities in the same way that they were needed in Massachusetts in
2003. Social support for same-sex marriage in New York allowed for the state to take a
legislative path to legalize same-sex marriage.
The national data polling data shows less than a majority of Americans in support for an
amendment defining marriage between a man and a woman in 2011. The New York polling data
reveals that greater than 50% of New Yorkers supported the legalization of same-sex marriage in
2011. This data supports Dworkin’s theory that as support for minority rights surpasses a
majority, legislatures will become more willing to recognize those rights. However, there are
some other factors that could have contributed to New York’s legalization of same-sex marriage.
First, the governor of New York, Andrew Cuomo, made it known that he wanted to legalize
same-sex marriage in New York. The New York Times writers Michael Barbaro and Nicholas
Confessore describe Governor Cuomo’s efforts to legalize same-sex marriage when they write
that:
Mr. Cuomo made same-sex marriage one of his top priorities for the year and deployed
his top aide to coordinate the efforts of a half-dozen local gay-rights organizations whose
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feuding and disorganization had in part been blamed for the defeat two years ago. The
new coalition of same-sex marriage supporters brought in one of Mr. Cuomo's trusted
campaign operatives to supervise a $3 million television and radio campaign aimed at
persuading several Republican and Democratic senators to drop their opposition.
(Barbaro).
Governor Cuomo’s efforts to legalize same-sex marriage might have persuaded those four
Republicans in the New York Senate to vote against their party in favor of the legislation that
legalized same-sex marriage. As previously mentioned in the Massachusetts case study, Gerald
Rosenberg believes that legislatures are more likely to pass bills legalizing same-sex marriage if
they receive support from the political elite and social majorities (Hollow Hope 350). In 2011,
same-sex marriage received support from political elites, including Governor Cuomo, and the
majority of New Yorkers. This is in direct contrast to Massachusetts in 2003 when the
Massachusetts Supreme Court took action to legalize same-sex marriage. Therefore, it is difficult
to say to what extent Governor Cuomo’s actions resulted in motivating the New York
Legislature to legalize same-sex marriage compared to the extent that public opinion support
impacted its legalization.
Another factor to consider is the fact that New York is one of the most prominent states
that has supported the rights of sexual minorities throughout history (Wockner 6). New York
City is known to have a generally large gay population compared to other metropolitan areas
throughout the country (Venugopal). The 2010 Census recorded 32,972 same-sex couple
households in New York which is a 27% increase since the 2000 Census (Venugopal). Also
according to the Census, the greatest number of same-sex couples in that live in New York live
in the New York City area (Venugopal). Due to its large gay population, the gay rights
movement originated in New York in the 1960s at the Stonewall Inn (Rosenfeld). The Stonewall
Inn in Greenwich Village was known to be a safe and accepting place for gay men and women in
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the 1960s (Rosenfeld). In 1969, the Stonewall Inn was raided and closed because of homophobic
sentiments (Rosenfeld). Its closing sparked massive protests and rallies in support of gay rights
and initiated the LGBT movement that lives on today (Rosenfeld). Therefore, New York’s
unique history as being the birthplace of the gay rights movement might have had an impact on
the legalization of same-sex marriage in the state. After New York passed same-sex marriage,
the Gay and Lesbian Task Force Executive Director, Rea Carey, said that the legalization was a
natural progression for a state whose history is immersed in advancements for sexual minorities
(Wockner 6). It is not easy to measure the impact of New York’s liberalism toward gay rights on
the New York Legislature’s decision to pass gay marriage. However, it is possible that New
York’s history was one factor that played into the legalization of same-sex marriage.

Case Study of California
So far, this thesis has examined the legalization of same-sex marriage in states that took a
single path toward legalization. The Massachusetts Supreme Court issued a ruling legalizing
same-sex marriage while the New York Legislature passed a bill legalizing the right. Both of the
case studies of these states have supported Ronald Dworkin’s theory. However, the temporary
legalization of same-sex marriage in California, and the subsequent events following the
temporary legalization pose a much more diverse explanation of how a state can come to legalize
same-sex marriage. California’s Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage in 2008 through the
case In re Marriage Cases and public officials in California began issuing marriage licenses to
same-sex couples (Perry v. Schwarzenegger 2010, at 2). Then in November 2008, California
voters passed Proposition 8, an amendment to the California Constitution defining marriage
between one man and one woman (Schmidtke 216). Two same-sex couples then filed a lawsuit,
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Perry v. Schwarzenegger, claiming that Proposition 8 violated their constitutional rights. The
lawsuit has made its way through a U.S. District Court and a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals and
is expected to be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court (Schmidtke 237). California represents a
state in which both the California Supreme Court and the California Legislature have made
attempts to determine the right to same-sex marriage. This struggle between the two branches of
California Government for the power of determining the right supports Ronald Dworkin’s
theory.
After the Goodrige decision in Massachusetts, officials in San Francisco began giving
same-sex couples in the area marriage licenses (In re Marriage Cases 2008, at 1). In Lockyer v.
City and County of San Francisco (2004) the California Supreme Court ruled that the officials in
San Francisco had acted unlawfully because there had been no judicial decision in California
concerning the constitutionality of the state’s same-sex marriage statute (at 230). After the
Lockyer decision, sex same-sex couples filed cases claiming that California’s prohibition of
same-sex marriage violated their constitutional rights (In re Marriage Cases 2008, at 2). These
six cases were combined to form the case In re Marriage Cases (2008) which eventually was
heard by the California Supreme Court (at at 2). Prior to the case, the California Legislature had
legalized domestic partnerships in the state (In re Marriage Cases 2008, at 2). Due to the
existence of domestic partnerships in the state, the California Supreme Court had to decide
whether the California Constitution required the designation of “marriage” to be extended to
same-sex couples rather than just the benefits (In re Marriage Cases 2008, at 4).
The California Supreme Court found that denying the name of marriage to same-sex
couples’ relationships violated their rights to due process and equal protection under the

Cerreta 95
California Constitution (In re Marriage Cases 2008, at 7-11). The written opinion for the case
states that:
The constitutionally based right to marry properly must be understood to encompass the
core set of basic substantive legal rights and attributes traditionally associated with
marriage that are so integral to an individual’s liberty and personal autonomy that they
may not be eliminated or abrogated by the Legislature or by the electorate through the
statutory initiative process. (In re Marriage Cases 2008, at 6).
The California Supreme Court found that domestic partnerships created a stigma against samesex relationships that marriage did not create for opposite-sex couples (In re Marriage Cases
2008, at 96-97). Through this case, California recognized a constitutional right to same-sex
marriage and the state began issuing marriage licenses to gay and lesbian couples.
The decision in In re Marriage Cases is an example of a court recognizing a minority
right that it believes to be guaranteed by the state constitution. Ronald Dworkin’s theory suggests
that the California Supreme Court determined the right to same-sex marriage because of its duty
to protect the rights of minorities against the oppression of the political and social majority. This
means that if Dworkin’s theory is correct, support for an amendment banning same-sex marriage
should have been at least 50% when the In res Marriage Cases decision was made in 2008. One
national public opinion poll was conducted in May 2008, which was the same month that the
California Supreme Court made its ruling. The poll consisted of 1,017 telephone interviews that
were conducted by Gallup, a highly respected polling organization (Gallup Poll 2008). The poll
asked “Would you favor or oppose a constitutional amendment that would define marriage as
being between a man and a woman, thus barring marriages between gay or lesbian couples?”
(Gallup Poll 2008). According to the poll results, 49% of respondents favored an amendment,
48% opposed an amendment and 3% had not opinion on the issue (Gallup Poll 2008). Table 7
shows a graph of the results of the poll.
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Table 7: Gallup Poll, May, 2008
Would you favor or oppose a constitutional amendment that would define marriage as being
between a man and a woman, thus barring marriages between gay or lesbian couples?

49% Favor
48% Oppose
3% No Opinion
Gallup Poll, May 2008. Retrieved Nov-27-2011 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center
for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

This poll reveals that at the time that the California Supreme Court made its decision, less than a
majority of the sampled Americans favored a constitutional amendment banning same-sex
marriage. The results show that citizens almost equally supported and opposed an amendment
prohibiting same-sex marriage in May 2008.
Since the number of those who supported banning same-sex marriage was less than 50%,
it cannot be concluded that the social majority disapproved of same-sex marriage. Instead, it can
only be concluded that there was not enough respondents who felt one way or the other about
same-sex marriage to constitute a majority opinion. Therefore, the results of this poll do not
support Dworkin’s theory. Although the number of respondents who supported an amendment
banning same-sex marriage was very close to a majority, it was not a majority.
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A second national poll was taken in 2008 and shows even less support for Dworkin’s
theory. A Quinnipiac Poll was conducted in which 1,783 respondents were interviewed by
telephone (Quinnipiac Poll 2008). The poll asked “Would you support or oppose amending the
United States Constitution to ban same sex-marriage?” (Quinnipiac Poll 2008). The results of the
poll showed that only 38% of respondents said they would support an amendment, 56% said they
would oppose such an amendment and 6% said they did not know (Quinnipiac Poll 2008). Table
8 shows a graph of the results of the poll.

Table 8: Quinnipiac University Poll, July, 2008
Would you support or oppose amending the United States Constitution to ban same sexmarriage?

38% Support
56% Oppose
6% Don’t know/No answer
Quinnipiac Poll, July 2008. Retrieved Nov-27-2011 from the iPOLL Databank, The
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html
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Clearly, this poll shows a difference in responses than the poll conducted by the Gallup
Organization in the same year. Although the Gallup Poll showed less than a majority supporting
an amendment banning same-sex marriage, the number who supported it in the poll was much
closer to a majority than the results of the Quinnipiac Poll. However, both polls refute Dworkin’s
theory. Both polls show less than a majority opposing same-sex marriage. According to
Dworkin, the courts take action to protect minority rights when they are not yet recognized by
the social and political majority. The California Supreme Court took action to recognize samesex marriage despite the fact that a majority of Americans did not oppose same-sex marriage.
This does not support Dworkin’s theory.
Although the national public opinion data does not support Dworkin’s theory, it is
possible that Dworkin’s theory might still be supported by the case study of California. At the
time of the decision of In re Marriage Cases, California residents might have been more
supportive of a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage than the sample of citizens
represented in the Quinnipiac and Gallup Polls. Although data is not readily available on the
public opinion of solely California residents in May 2008, the actions taken by the people of
California after the Supreme Court decision reveal that there was greater support among
Californians for a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage. This support is
demonstrated through the backlash against the California Supreme Court decision that resulted in
California voters passing an amendment to the California Constitution prohibiting same-sex
marriage.
The In re Marriage Cases decision sparked major backlash from opponents of same-sex
marriage. The backlash was so great that opponents were able to get an amendment to the
California Constitution on the ballot for the California elections in November, 2008 (“California
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Gay Marriage Banned”). If passed, the ballot measure, Proposition 8, would amend the
California Constitution to define marriage as between one man and one woman (“Proposition 8:
Amending the Constitution” 1). In the California Legislature Senate and Assembly Committees
on Judiciary Joint Informational Hearing “Proposition 8: Amending the Constitution to Eliminate
the Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry,” supporters and proponents of Proposition 8 were
allowed to speak. At the hearing Professor Goodwin Liu from U.C. Berkeley Boalt School of
Law provided perspective on some of the legal aspects of the California Supreme Court decision
and Proposition 8. In the hearing transcript he explains that although many residents of
California see the In re Marriage Cases decision as judicial activism, he legally believes that it is
the court’s responsibility to determine constitutional issues (“Proposition 8: Amending the
Constitution” 21). Professor Liu goes on to say:
I think that the term, judicial activism, is simply shorthand that people use for any
decision that they don’t like. And so, I don’t think it’s a particularly illuminating phrase,
because conservatives use it against liberals, liberals use it against conservative, and
largely it simply reflects people’s disagreement with the results of a particular decision.
(“Proposition 8: Amending the Constitution” 21).
Professor Liu does provide one criticism of the California Supreme Court, stating that it
“innovated” on the traditional levels of scrutiny used in Equal Protection Clause cases
(“Proposition 8: Amending the Constitution” 21). However, he concludes that Proposition 8, if
passed, would unconstitutionally label same-sex couples as second class citizens when he says,
“At the same time, Prop. 8 would maintain a separate but equal regime of marriage for opposite
sex couples and domestic partnership for same-sex couples” (“Proposition 8: Amending the
Constitution” 10).
Dr. Jennifer Roback Morse from The Ruth Institute spoke on behalf of Proposition 8 at
the hearing. In the hearing transcript she explains that Proposition 8 would ensure that children
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are properly raised by both their biological parents and that married couples procreate
(Proposition 8: Amending the Constitution” 39). However, her argument is strongly questioned
by the committee assembly members. Assemblymember Jones explains the contradiction he sees
in Dr. Morse’s argument when he says:
Okay, so just let me sum up. You wouldn’t ban infertility centers, even though the
children there won’t know who their biological parents are. You don’t agree with banning
adoption even though in those circumstances children are not being necessarily raised by
their biological parents. You’re okay with the adoption of children by gays and lesbians.
You don’t believe in banning divorce, even though by your own arguments there’s been
all sorts of analyses and studies that indicate divorce is very, very harmful on children.
It’s hard for me not conclude that this isn’t really about protecting children. (“Proposition
8: Amending the Constitution” 40).
After the assemblymembers question Dr. Morse, residents of California were allowed to speak
about Proposition 8. The hearing transcript shows that those residents at the hearing who
supported Proposition 8 believed that the assemblymembers’ questioning of Dr. Morse was
biased and one-sided (“Proposition 8: Amending the Constitution” 48). The contrast between the
social majority’s opinion about Proposition 8 and Professor Liu’s legal opinion about it is
evident in this hearing. The divide in the hearing realistically represented the divide between the
social majority’s refusal to recognize a right to same-sex marriage and the California Supreme
Court’s willingness to recognize it.
In the end, Proposition 8 passed with slightly over 52% of Californians who participated
in the voter referendum supporting it (Schmidtke 216). The number of residents who voted on
the measure exceeded 13 million (Schmidtke 216). The percentage of voters who voted for
Proposition 8 is the most direct display of public opinion that can be conducted. The results from
the Proposition 8 vote show that a majority of Californians supported an amendment to the
California Constitution banning same-sex marriage. In this case since it was put to a vote, there
is no question that a majority of Californians did not support same-sex marriage in November,
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2008. Proposition 8 passed and the California Constitution was amended to prohibit same-sex
marriage in the state. The passage of Proposition 8 supports Dworkin’s theory. According to
Dworkin’s theory about the development of rights, the courts have a responsibility to take
actions to protect minority rights when the majority does not wish to extend their own rights to
minority groups. In 2008, the California Supreme Court did step in to remedy the constitutional
violations against sexual minorities’ rights. However, the social majority did not agree with the
decision and revealed their clear opposition to same-sex marriage by passing Proposition 8.
Although the national public opinion polls show that the general public in America would not
have supported an amendment banning same-sex marriage, Californians felt differently.
The attempts to determine the right to same-sex marriage in California did not end with
Proposition 8. Two same-sex couples in California challenged the constitutionality of
Proposition 8 in the case Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010). The same-sex couples had tried to
receive marriage licenses in California but they were denied the licenses because Proposition 8
prohibited it (Perry v. Schwarzenegger 2010, at 1). They claimed that Proposition 8 violated
their rights to due process and equal protection (Perry v. Schwarzenegger 2010, at 1). The
Attorney General of California, Jerry Brown, and the Governor of California, Arnold
Schwarzenegger, refused to defend Proposition 8 in court (Perry v. Schwarzenegger 2010, at 3).
However, the courts found that proponents of Proposition 8 including, ProtectMarraige.Com,
were allowed to become the defendants in the case as “defendant-intervenors” (Perry v.
Schwarzenegger 2010, at 3). The case was brought to the United States District Court for
Northern California (Perry v. Schwarzenegger 2010, at 3). In the written decision for Perry v.
Schwarzenegger (2010), Chief U.S. District Judge Vaughn Walker ruled that Proposition 8
violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
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Constitution (at 135). Judge Walker’s decision found Proposition 8 to be unconstitutional and
overturned the ban on same-sex marriage.
In his written opinion, Judge Vaughn Walker establishes that marriage is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution when he writes, “That the
majority of California voters supported Proposition 8 is irrelevant, as ‘fundamental rights may
not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.’ West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 US 624, 638 (1943)” (then Perry v. Schwarzenegger 2010,
at 113). Judge Walker goes on to explain that Proposition 8 violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the U.S. Constitution because domestic partnerships do not provide same-sex couples with the
same social meaning that marriage provides opposite-sex couples (then Perry v. Schwarzenegger
2010, at 115). He finds that the only reason that Proposition 8 passed was moral disapproval and
that is not a legitimate reason for denying same-sex partners’ marriage rights (then Perry v.
Schwarzenegger 2010, at 135).
In 2011, Judge Walker resigned and announced that he was gay and had held a
relationship with another man for the past ten years (now Perry v. Brown 2012, at 78).
Supporters of Proposition 8 claimed that Judge Walker should have recused himself from the
case or disclosed that he was gay (now Perry v. Brown 2012, at 78). However, the courts of
California found that Judge Walker was not required to recuse himself or to disclose his sexual
orientation because judges are capable of making impartial decisions even though the decisions
might affect themselves (now Perry v. Brown 2012, at 78). Since the case was appealed, Judge
Walker’s decision was stayed, meaning that it would not be carried out due to the appeal (now
Perry v. Brown 2012, at 21).
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By ruling Proposition 8 unconstitutional, Judge Walker once again demonstrated that the
courts are able to take action to protect minority rights. The people of California voted for
Proposition 8, revealing that a majority of Californians approved of a constitutional amendment
banning same-sex marriage. Since the social majority in California was unwilling to extend
marriage rights to same-sex couples, the U.S. District Court took action to recognize the rights.
This supports Dworkin’s theory that when the social majority refuses to acknowledge the
constitutional rights of minority groups, the courts have a duty to protect those minority groups.
Since Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010) was filed in reaction to the California voters passing
Proposition 8, the case demonstrates a situation in which the majority suppresses the rights of
minorities and the courts protect those rights. The ruling in Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010)
supports Dworkin’s theory because Californians were unwilling to acknowledge same-sex
couples’ constitutional right to marriage.
Following Judge Walker’s decision, supporters of Proposition 8 appealed to the U.S.
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. A panel of judges on the Ninth Circuit had to determine whether
Proposition 8 violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Perry v.
Brown 2012 at 4). In the written decision of Perry v. Brown (2012) the majority of judges found
that Proposition 8 did violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution (at 4).
However, the judges gave a reason for the violation that was specific to California which could
not be broadly applied to all states. In the written decision Judge Stephen Reinhardt writes,
“Proposition 8 singles out same-sex couples for unequal treatment by taking away from them
alone the right to marry, and this action amounts to a distinct constitutional violation because the
Equal Protection Clause protect minority groups from being targeted for the deprivation of an
existing right without a legitimate reason” (Perry v. Brown 2012, at 34). Therefore, the judges on
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the panel distinctly explained that Proposition 8 violated the Equal Protection Clause because
California had already given the right of marriage to same-sex couples. This ruling is fairly
narrow. The decision relies on the constitutional idea that rights that are already given to
minority groups should not be easily taken away. Unlike California, most states have not given
the right of marriage to same-sex couples and then taken that right away. Therefore, the ruling of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals does not apply broadly to other states. Ultimately though in
California, Judge Walker’s original decision was upheld through the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
The Ninth Circuit Court ruling provides further evidence of the courts’ attempt to
recognize same-sex marriage. The ruling was made in early 2012 when national public opinion
support for same-sex marriage was at an all time high. In March 2012 NBC News and the Wall
Street Journal surveyed 800 people through telephone interviews (NBC/Wall Street Journal Poll
2012). They asked respondents “Do you favor or oppose allowing gay and lesbian couples to
enter into same-sex marriages?” (NBC/Wall Street Journal Poll 2012). 49% of respondents said
they favored same-sex marriages while 40% said they opposed them (NBC/Wall Street Journal
Poll 2012). Table 9 shows the results of the poll when it was asked in 2012.

Table 9: NBC/Wall Street Journal Poll, March, 2012
Do you favor or oppose allowing gay and lesbian couples to enter into same-sex marriages?
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Answer

%

Favor Allowing Same-Sex Marriages
Strongly Favor
Somewhat Favor

49
32
17

Oppose Allowing Same-Sex Marriages 40
Somewhat Oppose
9
Strongly Oppose
31
Depends

3

Not Sure

8

NBC/Wall Street Journal Poll, March 2012. Retrieved March 31, 2012.Human Rights Campaign.
“NBC/WSJ Poll Shows Country Continues to Move Toward Marriage Equality.”
http://www.hrc.org/press-releases/entry/nbc-wsj-poll-shows-country-continues-to-move
toward-marriage-equality
These numbers were reversed when the same question was asked by the news organizations in
October 2009 (NBC/Wall Street Journal Poll 2012). Therefore, there has been a clear move
toward acceptance of same-sex marriage by the nation. However, according to this poll, support
for same-sex marriage still lacks a majority. There was also a Field Poll conducted in February
2012 that specifically questioned California residents. The telephone interview poll was
comprised of 1,003 registered voters in California (Field Poll 2012). The poll asked “Do you
approve or disapprove of California allowing homosexuals to marry members of their own sex
and have regular marriage laws apply to them?” (Field Poll 2012). According to the poll, 59% of
Californians approved of same-sex marriage while 34% disapproved and 7% had no opinion
(Field Poll 2012). Table 10 shows the results of the poll broken down by the year.

Table 10: Field Poll, February, 2012
Do you approve or disapprove of California allowing homosexuals to marry members of their
own sex and have regular marriage laws apply to them?
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Answer

%

Approve

59

Disapprove 34
No Opinion

7

Field Poll, February 2012. Retrieved March 31, 2011 from The Field Poll Research Corporation.
http://field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/Rls2406.pdf

This poll shows that in 2012, a majority of Californians supported same-sex marriage.
The California Supreme Court’s original decision occurred at a time when support for
same-sex marriage was below a majority. The will of the majority was then recognized through
the passage of Proposition 8 in 2008. Directly following its passage, Proposition 8 was
challenged through the courts because of the courts’ ability to make constitutional decision
independent from social support. Since the claim against Proposition 8 originated in the courts, it
will continue to progress through the courts by appeal until it most likely reaches the United
States Supreme Court. Although support for same-sex marriage has reached a majority in
California, the courts will continue to make decisions regarding the right to same-sex marriage
because of the natural process that cases go through in the judiciary. If the courts in California
had never intervened in the issues, Dworkin’s theory would suggest that since support for samesex marriage exceeds a majority, the California Legislature should be influenced to recognize the
right. However, the events that have transpired in the California Supreme Court, the U.S. District
Court and the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have placed same-sex marriage on a pathway
that Dworkin’s theory suggests must ultimately lead to a decision by the United States Supreme
Court.
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Case Studies Conclusion
Overall, the case studies of Massachusetts, New York and California support Dworkin’s
theory of the determination of rights. The national polling data and the actions of the political
and social majority in Massachusetts in 2003 support Dworkin’s theory that the courts determine
the constitutional rights of minority groups when there is a lack of support from the majority.
Polling data from the national level and the state level in New York supports Dworkin’s theory
that as the social majority becomes more accepting of minority rights, legislatures are more
likely to recognize those rights. Lastly, although California’s process of legalization has been
much more complex than Massachusetts and New York, it also generally supports Dworkin’s
theory.
These three case studies provide evidence that Dworkin’s theory, which he wrote in the
1970s, is applicable to a contemporary issue. Although legalization has occurred in several
states, a vast majority of states still do not recognize same-sex marriage and even have
constitutional amendments defining marriage as being between a man and a woman. Therefore,
the nation as a whole is still reluctant to recognize the right. In his book, Dworkin eventually
concludes that controversial constitutional issues should be determined on the federal level by
the United States Supreme Court (Dworkin 134). Interestingly, it appears that this portion of
Dworkin’s theory might soon be supported by the progression of the case Perry v. Brown (2012).

Thesis Conclusion
In Taking Rights Seriously Ronald Dworkin explains that the Founding Fathers
intentionally left parts of the Constitution ambiguous so that they could be interpreted by the
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Supreme Court to ensure that rights evolved with the progression of American culture (136). He
writes, “If those who enacted the broad clauses had meant to lay down particular conceptions,
they would have found the sort of language conventionally used to do this, that is, they would
have offered particular theories of the concepts in question” (Dworkin 136). According to
Dworkin, the United States Supreme Court should be responsible for determining those broad
clauses and controversial rights (137). Therefore, based on Dworkin’s theory, the constitutional
issue of same-sex marriage should ultimately be decided by the Supreme Court because issues
that deal with the Bill of Rights can be more fairly decided by the Court than by Congress (142).
Similarly to the state level, Dworkin suggests that the Supreme Court is the proper government
institution to determine rights because it is more likely to protect and ensure the rights of
minorities compared to Congress, which is influenced by the opinion of the political and social
elite (142).
His theory is supported by the enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),
which was passed by Congress in 1996 (U.S. Congress “DOMA”). DOMA defines marriage on
the federal level as being between one man and one woman (U.S. Congress “DOMA”). The act
also says that states do not have to legally recognize same-sex marriages performed in other
states (U.S. Congress “DOMA”). A NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll conducted 2,004
telephone interviews in 1996 asked respondents “Do you think marriage between two people of
the same sex should be allowed, or do you think marriage should be limited only to the union of
a man and a woman?” (NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll 1996). The poll found that 67% said
that they did not think same-sex marriage should be allowed and only 25% said they believed it
should be allowed (NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll 1996). Table 11 shows a graph of the
results of the poll.
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Table 11: NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll, September, 1996
Do you think marriage between two people of the same sex should be allowed, or do you think
marriage should be limited only to the union of a man and a woman?

25% Should Allow
67% Should be Limited
8% Not Sure
NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll, September, 1996. Retrieved Apr-2-2012 from the iPOLL
Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html

This means that at the time DOMA was passed, a clear majority opposed same-sex marriage.
Dworkin would argue that DOMA was passed as a reflection of the public’s unwillingness to
recognize a right of sexual minorities and that the courts have a duty to challenge it. Currently,
the constitutionality of DOMA is being challenged in a court case that is headed for a federal
appeals court in Massachusetts (“Battle Over Federal Defense of Marriage Act”). The case is
advancing after a federal judge in Massachusetts in 2010 ruled that the law illegally infringes on
a state’s right to determine the entitlement to marriage and denies married same-sex couples a
plethora of federal rights (“Battle Over Federal Defense of Marriage Act”).
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Previous sections of this thesis have established that the right to same-sex marriage is a
right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Since
Congress has been unwilling to recognize this right, it is the responsibility of the Supreme Court
to recognize it. It appears that in reality, the California case Perry v. Brown (2012) will be
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. According to Dworkin, the decision that results
from the Court should be the legal recognition of a right to same-sex marriage. However, there
are certain other factors that might influence the decision of the Supreme Court. The political
ideology of the Supreme Court Justices could have a major impact on any same-sex marriage
decision. Currently, there are more Supreme Court Justices on the bench who were nominated by
Republican Presidents than Democrat Presidents (“Biographies of Current Justices”). Therefore,
if the Justices were to make their decision based on their political ideologies, there would be a
greater chance that they would not find a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.
In addition to their personal ideology, the Justices could be influenced by their personal
beliefs of whether the courts or the legislatures should decide the issue. In almost every case
mentioned in this thesis a member of the court wrote a dissenting opinion stating that the courts
should leave it up to the legislatures to decide the policy on same-sex marriage. For example,
Justice Scalia dissented in both Lawrence v. Texas (2003) and Romer v. Evans (1996) claiming
that the Supreme Court was overstepping its authority and should have upheld the legislative
decisions that the cases were based on. Therefore, Justice Scalia would likely vote against the
legalization of same-sex marriage if Perry v. Brown (2012) makes it to the Supreme Court. If
other Supreme Court Justices hold similar beliefs about the role and responsibility of the Court,
same-sex marriage might not be recognized.
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Perry will most likely be appealed to the Supreme Court. Not only has Dworkin’s theory
been generally supported by the three case studies, but also, by the likelihood of the issue
reaching the Supreme Court. However, the decision of the Court will most likely not be based
solely on whether a minority right is being suppressed by the will of the majority. The Justices’
political ideology and the personal beliefs about the duties of the branches of government will
also most likely have an impact on the decision. Therefore, only time will tell whether the
Dworkin’s theory that the Supreme Court has a duty to step in and protect minority rights is
supported or refuted by this issue.
The first section of this thesis has analyzed the doctrinal development of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to privacy. The Equal Protection
Clause analysis included the examination of the decisions in the Supreme Court cases Loving v.
Virginia (1967) and Romer v. Evans (1996). The right to privacy cases included Griswold v. CT
(1965) and Lawrence v. Texas (2003). The results of this analysis reveal that a right to same-sex
marriage exits under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The arguments that the government gives for prohibiting same-sex marriage
do not pass even the lowest level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, the rational basis
test. Therefore, this thesis establishes that there is a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.
The second section of this thesis has established that Ronald Dworkin’s theory of the
determination of rights is supported by the legalization of same-sex marriage in three case
studies. Although Dworkin’s theory is supported by the process of legalization in the three states
used in this thesis, it is possible that factors other than majority support have influenced the
legalization of same-sex marriage in the eight states and Washington D.C. Additional factors
might include the influence of governors and the political elite, the political ideology of the
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legislatures and courts, the history of gay rights in the state and the ability of the state to
overcome backlash by political and moral organizations. This thesis only investigated Dworkin’s
theory that constitutional rights issues should be decided by the courts because of their isolation
from the opinion of the social majority. However, further research could be done to determine
the impact of these other variables on the legalization of same-sex marriage.
Ronald Dworkin ultimately concludes that constitutional issues need to be decided by the
United States Supreme Court. If Perry v. Brown (2012) is appealed to the Supreme Court or the
case against DOMA eventually reaches the Supreme Court, Dworkin’s theory will either be
refuted or supported. According to the results of this thesis, if one of the cases does make it to
the Supreme Court, the Court has a duty to recognize that same-sex marriage is a constitutional
right under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This thesis shows that
Gerald Rosenberg’s theory that the courts are weak and ineffective is not always supported by
the legalization of same-sex marriage in the states. In "Saul Alinsky and the Litigation Campaign
to Win the Right to Same-Sex Marriage" Rosenberg claims that the litigation campaign to
legalize same-sex marriage acted too quickly ignoring that public support was lacking (667).
However, Dworkin’s theory demonstrates that the courts are the most effective pathway for the
legalization of minority rights when public support is missing. Supporters of same-sex marriage
took the necessary steps to legalize the right by going through the courts. Rosenberg would
suggest that proponents of same-sex marriage should have waited indefinitely until support from
the public and political elite reached a majority. If proponents in Massachusetts had followed this
path, marriage would not have been legalized in 2003 and it would not have been legalized in
California in 2008. Contrary to Rosenberg’s claim, the litigation campaign did not ignore the
lack of support for same-sex marriage. Instead, the campaign realized that the Judiciary was the
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only branch of government that would fairly recognize a right to same-sex marriage when public
support was lacking. Therefore, this thesis suggests that Rosenberg’s theory on the development
of rights does not apply to the legalization of same-sex marriage in certain states.
In The Hollow Hope Rosenberg describes situations in which the courts have made
rulings and been unable to enforce those rulings. Therefore, he concludes that the courts are
ineffective at implementing social change. The legalization of same-sex marriage in
Massachusetts refutes this theory. Although the California Supreme court decision was
challenged through Proposition 8, the courts in California have continued to determine the right
through Perry v. Brown (2012). Therefore, legalization in California also refutes his theory.
Despite Rosenberg’s belief in the Court’s ineffectiveness, it will most likely be the final
arbitrator on this issue. According to Dworkin, it is the proper role of the Supreme Court to
determine this constitutional issue and his theory has been supported by legalization at the state
level. Proponents of same-sex marriage could not stand idly by and wait for Congress or the
American people to legitimize the constitutional right to same-sex marriage as Rosenberg would
suggest. This is especially true since so many states have adopted legislation defining marriage
between a man and a woman. The history of the legalization of same-sex marriage has made it
clear that the legislatures and the courts have been playing a tug of war game for the
responsibility of determining the right. Ultimately, the responsibility must go to the Supreme
Court of the United States.
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